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I. Technological, Economic, and Political Catalysts
In the twentieth century, modern technology has fueled a mas-
sive increase in the potential for exchange of goods, services, and
communication. As technology advances, the world becomes more
economically intertwined and economic borders tend to disappear.
This in turn has facilitated a confluence of world markets, political
structures, and societies.
Out of necessity, convenience, or a desire for mutual progress,
governments have come together on diplomatic, political, economic
and cultural levels. This trend has expanded as the forces of democ-
ratization and privatization have been unleashed after more than
seventy years of polarization between controlled and free economies.
Regional associations that have emerged range from agreements of
mere mutual toleration (such as the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS)' to complex integration systems (such as the European
Community).
The New World Order optimism of 1989 and 1990 resulting
from the disintegration of the Berlin Wall and emergence of demo-
cratic political systems seeking to replace. controlled economies with
free market systems has been dimmed by sober realism. This new
1. However, the dynamic evolving character of these organizations is illustrated by re-
cent proposed economic union between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Russia, Ukraine, Belarus
Set Economic Union, THE REUTERS Bus. REP., July 10, 1993. More recently, ten of fifteen
former Soviet Republics signed a treaty of economic union.. Leyla Boulton, Economic Union
for 10 Soviet Republics, FIN. TIMES WEEKEND, Sept. 25-26, 1993, at 2.
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realism is in part a product of the formidable and inevitable difficul-
ties encountered in the transition from controlled to free economies.
It also is in part a product of the proliferating civil wars, ethnic self
assertions, and the resulting break up of nation states.
Despite these examples of fragmentation, experiments in re-
gional economic arrangements continue to proliferate as the belief
grows that they contribute to improved productivity by maximizing
the efficient use of resources (labor, capital, land, goods, natural re-
sources). These arrangements have also laid foundations for im-
proved international relations and expanded unions on political, so-
cial, cultural, and monetary levels.
The European Community [EC] experience is of particular rele-
vance to harmonization efforts of emerging regional and other orga-
nizations. By virtue of its rulemaking procedures and highly struc-
tured dispute resolution institutions, the EC has achieved higher
levels of harmonization of laws than any other international organi-
zation. This Article analyzes harmonization procedures in the EC
mandatory-rulemaking and dispute resolution institutional context.
It will then address similarities and differences in the harmonization
procedures of regional organizations which rely on voluntary-
rulemaking and less structured dispute resolution procedures.
Most regional organizations lack the mandatory rulemaking and
highly structured dispute resolution institutions of the European
Community. They function instead by use of voluntary consensus
rulemaking and less structured dispute resolution procedures. This
latter type of organization includes:
1. Canada-United States Free Trade Area;
2. North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA);
3. Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) (replacing
in 1980 the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA), which
had existed since 1960);
4. Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), which is one
of the several organizations working under the umbrella of Latin
American Integration Association (ALADI);
5. European Free Trade Association (EFTA), now developing
into an adjunct of the EC as the European Economic Area
(EEA);
6. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN);
7. Former Eastern European Bloc Countries and the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS).
Unlike the framework documents of the above organizations,
the 1957 Treaty of Rome, as amended, provides for a Commission,
Council, Parliament, and Court of Justice within the European Com-
munity and an accompanying constitutional structure for achieving a
Spring 1993]
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substantially mandatory-type harmonization. This is accomplished
primarily through issuance of regulations and directives emanating
from a central-authority system. Regional organizations like those
listed above generally lack such institutions, but nevertheless possess
a wide range of techniques available to implement harmonization on
a consensual basis through use of procedures such as:
1. Conventions;
2. Model Laws;
3. Guidelines (such as those drawn up by UNCITRAL with ref-
erence to international contracts for the construction of indus-
trial works);
4. Texts developed by expert bodies for incorporation into agree-
ments by the contracting parties (i.e., the Uniform Customs and
Practices and INCOTERMS prepared by the International
Chamber of Commerce); or
5. Other devices which may be developed.2
The need of organizations like NAFTA (which do not provide a
constitutional structure for achieving mandatory-type harmoniza-
tion) to resolve as many problems as possible prior to the official
creation of the organization creates pressure for adoption of so-called
"parallel agreements" to resolve labor, environmental, safeguard,
and other types of anticipated concerns. Nevertheless, during the op-
eration of any regional organization, unanticipated problems will in-
evitably arise, which in the absence of a constitutional structure for
achieving mandatory-type harmonization, will require use of consen-
sus building procedures of the type noted above.
II. The European Community Experience
A. Five Major Integration Stages in the Evolution of the Euro-
pean Community
Integration tends to follow a progressive pattern. Beginning with
a free trade area, the progression may move through a sequence of
more sophisticated stages to a customs union, single market, mone-
tary union, and ultimately to political union. The European Com-
munity appears to be following this sequence.
1. Free Trade Area.-The free trade area is an opening of
markets between two or more states with respect to goods, services,
labor, and capital. This process is frequently gradual, with an initial
concentration on movement of goods without tariffs or duties, and
2. For a discussion of use of these procedures in transnational harmonization, see Louis
F. Del Duca, Developing Transnational Harmonization Procedures for the Twenty-first Cen-
tury in COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW-NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS 28
(Cranston & Goode, eds., Oxford University Press, 1993)
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then focusing on more complex and sophisticated areas of service,
labor, and capital movements. Even within these categories, initial
agreements are generally confined to specified products, services, la-
bor, and capital. On a more advanced level, the agreements will take
a sectoral approach. The goal in a sectoral approach is to act simul-
taneously on groups of products, services, labor, and capital. Caution
generally dictates restrained use of broad sectoral groupings at the
inception of a free trade association.
2. Customs Union.-In terms of degrees of sophistication, the
next level of integration is the customs union. The free trade agree-
ment envisions elimination of tariffs among the contracting states.
The customs union, in addition, envisions the setting of common tar-
iffs by member states vis-a-vis third party states. Contracting states
mutually agree to impose identical tariff standards on outside states.
With respect to tariffs, conditions for penetration into markets of the
treaty states are thereby made uniform.
3. Single Market.-The single market is an attempt at com-
plete economic integration beyond the level achieved by a customs
union common market. It addresses not only 'emoval of internal bor-
der-tariffs and setting common tariffs vis-a-vis external states, but
also aims at removing internal non-tariff barriers to free movement
of resources. In the context of the experience of the European Com-
munity, the Single Market program is a more sophisticated attempt
to achieve the common market goals already articulated in the 1957
Treaty of Rome. The non-tariff barriers targeted for removal by the
Single Market program take the form of physical, fiscal, and techno-
logical obstacles. The goal is to remove these non-tariff barriers and
thereby create a unified economic market, which will more effec-
tively shift resources to areas of maximum utility. 3 Proponents argue
that the single-market will thus achieve a level of productivity and
standard of living higher than the level achievable under a customs
union that has failed to remove non-tariff barriers.
4. Monetary Union.-Monetary union involves use of a com-
mon currency. A high level of economic integration is a prerequisite
for monetary union. The move to a common currency should there-
fore be preceded by a substantial period of compliance with sound
and harmonious monetary policies among member nations. When
national currencies mirror one another in fluctuation and stability,
3. PAOLO MENGOZZI, European Community Law - From Common Market to Euro-
pean Union, 5 (Patrick Del Duca trans., 1992); MELVYN B. KRAUSS. DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT
AID: GROWTH. POVERTY AND GOVERNMENT 49-50 (1983); LUDWIG VON MISES. LIBERALISM:
IN CLASSICAL TRADITION 130-36 (Ralph Raico trans., 3d ed., 1985).
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countries are prepared for monetary union." The mechanisms and
institutions that will govern and coordinate fiscal policy must also be
in place. 5 These matters are discussed in greater detail later in this
article.6
5. Political Union.-Political union is the most sophisticated
level of integration. It entails merging of governments with respect
to legislative, military, diplomatic, judicial, administrative, and for-
eign relations activities. 7 The substantial surrender of sovereignty in-
volved in this sophisticated level of integration presents formidable
obstacles to its achievement. Sensitivities are created because of dif-
ferences in among other things, history, language, customs, forms of
government. 8 Implementation of this stage of integration therefore
requires articulation and broad-based recognition of the advantages
to be obtained from the creation of a political union. These advan-
tages can then be evaluated against the disadvantages which may be
involved as a result of the surrender of sovereignty to the political
union.
B. The Chronology of European Community Development
1. The Three Treaties of the European Community.-The
European Community, a success-story in regional integration, has
developed in "stages" slowly making the transition from independent
states to a cohesive community. Recognition of the need for coopera-
tion developed as a result of the disastrous consequences of two
World-wars in this century, and the pre-20th century history of con-
tinuous conflict. Out of the chaos of the early-1940s, came responses
in the form of the Council of Europe (1949),' the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (1953),o and the three European Community
treaties (1951, 1957). Proposals for a European Defense Community
and a stronger European Union failed to materialize in these early
days."
The European Community [EC] began with three interrelated,
4. Alex Brummer, On the Way to Union, Europe Gets the Jitters NEWSDAY, May 31,
1992, at 27.
5. Treaty on European Union ("Maastricht Treaty") 7 Feb. 92, at Title VI Economic
and Monetary Policy; Council of the European Communities, Treaty on European Union 24-
44 (1992).
6. See infra notes 91-125.
7. Treaty on European Union, supra note 5; see New European Union Treaty Signed
at Maastricht, EC NEws No. 3192, Feb. 7, 1992 (E.C. Office of Press and Public Affairs,
N.Y.).
8. MICHAEL CALINGAERT. THE 1992 CHALLENGE FROM EUROPE: DEVELOPMENT OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S INTERNAL MARKET 20 (1988).
9. Treaty Establishing the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S' 103.
10. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (No-
vember 4, 1950), 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
11. P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT. INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
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but separate treaties: European Coal and Steel Community [ECSC
by 1951 Treaty of Paris],12 Atomic Energy Community
[EURATOM, 1957],13 and the European Economic Community
[EEC by 1957 Treaty of Rome]." "Gradualism" in the evolution of
regional organizations is illustrated by the adoption and implementa-
tion of these treaties. Each treaty had its own focus and subject mat-
ter, but they mutually shared implementing institutions which have
become more closely integrated over the years. The ECSC dealt with
regulation of coal and steel industries. EURATOM was directed at
research and development of atomic energy. The Treaty of Rome
sought to lay the groundwork for an open-ended European Common
Market [EEC]. Six countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands) were parties to the three treaties and
were subject to the institutions. 5 Eventual expansion of the Euro-
pean Community to twelve members by 1992 is another example of
"gradualism" in the evolution of regional organizations. Another ex-
ample of gradual integration is evidenced by the fact that the institu-
tions of the three treaties were officially merged in 1967.16 In addi-
tion, over a 36 year period the institutions themselves have grown in
stature and power.
2. The 1957 Treaty of Rome.-The Treaty of Rome was the
broadest and the most far-reaching of the three treaties. It is, in ef-
fect, the constitution of the European Community. Divided into six
parts, with 248 articles, 7 it sets forth basic principles of Community
law and objectives for the member states. The guiding principles and
foundations for Community development are cooperation, nondis-
crimination, uniform application of Community law, realization of a
single market, direct applicability of Community law, and mutual
recognition by each member state of other member states' norms
that are not provided for by Community law and do not violate basic
requirements of Community law."
(a) The Common Market (Free Trade And Customs Un-
ions).-The primary objective of the EEC was to create a common
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 9-13 (Laurence W. Gormley ed. 1989).
12. Treaty of Paris Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18,
1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.
13. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, March 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 167.
14. Treaty of Rome Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11.
15. MaNGOZZI, supra note 3, at 2.
16. [Merger Treaty] Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of
the European Communities April 8, 1965. J.O. 1967, 152/2.
17. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14.
18. MENGOZZI, supra note 3, at 5.
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market by simultaneous formation of a free trade area and a cus-
toms union. The first two stages of integration were accordingly pur-
sued concurrently. The treaty, in Part Two, Title I, looked to a free-
trade/customs-union treatment of goods by specifying that members
were to eliminate customs duties and quantitative restrictions be-
tween themselves and set up a common external customs tariff over
the course of a twelve-year transitional period, only ten of which
were actually needed.' 9 The implementation and specifics of the pro-
cess were to be handled through the Community institutions.20
(b) Institutional Framework.-Unlike many treaties, the
Treaty of Rome extends beyond the four corners of the document. It
provides objectives and an institutional framework for achieving
these objectives. The four principal institutions of this framework are
the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, and the
Court of Justice.2' To obtain membership in the European Commu-
nity, a state must accept all three treaties, the institutional frame-
work and the "acquis communautaire" (body of Community law in-
cluding all actions of the institutions).22 In 1973, Denmark, Ireland,
and the United Kingdom joined the EC. Subsequently, in 1981,
Greece joined and in 1986, Spain and Portugal joined.2"
The Council, consisting of the head of state or government of
each member state or their appointees, is the primary legislative
arm. 4 With respect to legislative matters it may generally only act
on proposals submitted by the Commission." The European Parlia-
ment, relatively powerless initially, but in the process of acquiring
new powers,26 has 518 members elected since 1979 by direct univer-
sal suffrage.27 Although elected from the Member States, the Parlia-
ment is organized by political parties rather than by nationalities. 8
The Commission makes recommendations and proposals to the
Council, possesses administrative duties, and supervises the Commu-
19. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, pt. 2, tit. 1; see also Calingaert, supra note 8, at 5.
20. Id.; see also MENGOZZI, supra note 3, at 5-6.
21. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, pt. 5, tit. 1, Chapter 1; see KAPTEYN, supra note 1I,
at 103. (These are provided for in Part 5, Title 1, Chapter 1, of the Treaty of Rome.)
22. MENGOZZI, supra note 3, at 3.
23. Anders Nervell, The Emerging European Economic Space: A Proposed Legal
Framework for Expanding EEC-EFTA Relations Beyond the Free Trade Agreements, 21
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 181, 185 n.21 (1990).
24. MENGOZZI, supra note 3, at 14, 25-26; Kapteyn, supra note II, at 103-108.
25. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, pt. 5, tit. 1, Ch. 1, art. 145; see also MENGOZZI,
supra note 3, at 25-26.
26. Single European Act, O.J. 1987, No. L169/1; Kapteyn, supra note 11, at 131, 137-
43.
27. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, pt. 5, tit. 1, Chapter 1, Section 1: The European
Parliament.
28. MENGOZZI, supra note 3, at 15.
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nity to ensure compliance with E.C. law.2 9 If the Commission finds
any instances of breach or infringement, it investigates, issues rul-
ings, issues opinions, and ultimately brings actions before the Euro-
pean Court of Justice [ECJ] .30 Member states in turn as well as
other institutions of the European Community may challenge actions
of the Commisssion before the ECJ. a1 In addition, the courts of the
member states may and in some instances must certify community
law questions to the ECJ for preliminary rulings."2 The ECJ (with
thirteen Judges and six Advocates General) is the final judicial
authority. 3
(c) Forms And Sources Of European Community
Law.-Community law itself takes several forms in addition to the
primary norms found in the Treaty of Rome as amended. These in-
clude: (1) regulations; (2) directives; (3) decisions; and (4) recom-
mendations/opinions. " The European Court of Justice has also held
that the general principles of international law and principles of law
generally recognized by the domestic law of member states may be
used as a source of community law when there is a gap in Commu-
nity law in the issue to be addressed. Under this theory, the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights has been held to be a part of
Community Law. 5 Regulations have general application and are au-
tomatically binding in their entirety. Implementation of regulations
through the enactment of national legislation is unnecessary.36 Un-
like regulations, directives are binding only as to their stated ends,
with discretion given to member states to select the means of imple-
mentation.3 Although each directive contains a deadline for imple-
mentation, the directive itself generally does not have effect until the
member state has completed implementation. However, recent cases
have ruled that if a member state fails to implement a directive
within the time set by the Council the Directive will be binding and
have direct effect if it is complete, precise, clear, and also uncondi-
tional.38 Decisions are binding, but because they are addressed only
29. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, pt. Part 5, tit. I, arts. 155, 162; see also MENGOZZI,
supra note 3, at 30; and KAPTEYN, supra note I1, at 108-113.
30. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, pt. 5, tit. 1, arts. 155, 169, 173.
31. Id. art. 173.
32. Id. art. 177.
33. Id. arts. 176, 179, 187.
34. Id. art. 189; KAPTEYN, supra note 11, at 185-88.
35. Stauder v. City of Ulm, Case 29/69, [1969] ECR 419, CMLR 112 (1970); see
KAPTEYN, supra note 11, at 165-67; MENGOZZI, supra note 2, at Chapter 13.
36. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, at pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 2, art. 189; see also MENGOZZI,
supra note 3, at 88-89; KAPTEYN, supra note 11, at 191-93.
37. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, at pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 3, art. 189; see also MENGOZZI,
supra note 3, at 90; KAPTEYN, supra note 11, at 193-97.
38. See Van Gend & Loos Case 26/62 [1963] ECR 1; Public Prosecutor v. Ratti, Case
148/78 [1979] ECR, 2 CMLR 105 (1963); Francovich v. Italian Republic, Case C-6/90
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to a particular entity for compliance, they prove to be very narrow in
scope. Although non-binding, recommendations and opinions serve
as indicators of Council or Commission policy. 9
3. The 1985 White Paper and the 1987 Single European
Act.-In the 1980s, the twelve members of the European Commu-
nity took a more ambitious approach. The many years of European
Community membership provided a strong foundation for the mem-
ber states to move ahead. In June 1985, the Commission issued its
famous "White Paper" report largely -authored by Britain's Lord
Cockfield, who was then a Vice President of the Commission.40 This
report contained 300 legislative proposals for the elimination of eco-
nomic barriers (tariff and non-tariff) by 1992. The objective was to
expedite the progression toward a single, expanding, and flexible
market.41 The benefits of a single market involving comprehensive
economic integration was expressed in the Cecchini Report42 , which
emphasized the costs of Non-Europe and the benefits of integration.
Integration would create an economy-of-scale with a corresponding
rise in GNP, consumer advantage, and enhanced economic power of
Europe. s As an example of a "non-Europe" cost, failure to harmo-
nize European standards in the area of telecommunications alone
was estimated to cost Europe $6 billion annually."'
In response, the Single European Act [SEA] of 1987 amended
the Treaty of Rome to facilitate adoption of 282 directives, which
the White Paper identified as necessary for achievement of the Sin-
gle Market by the end of 1992. This was the most radical and signif-
icant move toward integration since the 1957 Treaty of Rome.
The White Paper identifies three types of barriers - physical,
fiscal and technological - for which directives would have to be im-
plemented in order to achieve the 1992 goal.4 5 Physical barriers are
[1990] ECR, 2 CMLR 66 (1991) for applicability of Directive after time of implementation
has expired. See also Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Van Gerven, M.H. Marshall, Case C-
271/91 (Jan. 23, 1993). The opinion of the Court in this latter case is pending at the time of
printing of this article. The case has raised interesting issues regarding so-called vertical and
horizontal direct effect of directives. It raises issues regarding recognition of the direct effect
of sufficiently precise and unconditional provisions of directives vis-a-vis individuals on whom
the directive would have imposed obligations had it been correctly implemented.
39. MENGOZZI, supra note 3, at 107-109.
40. White Paper from the Commission to the European Council: Completing the Inter-
nal Market, (June 1985, Luxembourg/Brussels: Office for Official Publications of the Euro-
pean Communities) [hereinafter White Paper]; KAPTEYN, supra note 11, at 26-27.
41. id.
42. Paolo Cecchini, et. al., The European Challenge 1992: The Benefits of a Single
Market (The Cecchini Report), Wildwood House, 1988.
43. MENGOZZI, supra note 3, at 5-6; RICHARD OWEN AND MICHAEL DYNES. THE TIMES
GUIDE To THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 32 (1992).
44. Calingaert, supra note 8, at 26.
45. White Paper, supra note 40, art. 10; Nervell, supra note 23, at 200-201.
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border controls over goods and people (e.g. customs posts, immigra-
tion controls). These barriers cause delay, are burdensome, and add
costs to commerce. Also, physical barriers are a visible indication of
continued division between countries. One directive combatting these
barriers created a Single Administrative Document (1988) to replace
the hundreds of different documents that had to be shown by com-
mercial trucks at border control. 6 This saves time and money, ren-
dering trade more efficient. In order to complete the elimination of
physical barriers, harmonization procedures must address some
highly sensitive areas (e.g. drug trafficking, criminal and terrorist
prevention policies, general immigration). The Schengen Agreement
is an attempt to address these matters.4
Technical barriers are created by differing product regulations
and standards.4 For example, Philips, an electric appliance manu-
facturer, must produce different kinds of plugs on its products, in
order to comply with differing standards (e.g. two-prong, three-
prong, etc. . . .) among the various member states. Unless Philips
does this, it is foreclosed from sales in a particular market.4 9 Such
barriers have the effect of distorting product patterns, increasing
costs, and fracturing markets. 50 In response, the EC has at last ap-
proved a plan to standardize by a gradual conversion to the
"Europlug." 5' 1
Unless an effort is made to eliminate technical barriers, the
economy and its entrepreneurs and consumers are deprived from en-
joying the benefits of an economy-of-scale, as envisioned by the
Cecchini Report, that comes with the enlarged "European" mar-
ket. 52 Harmonization procedures also need to focus closely on techni-
cal standards as they impact on consumer protection, environmental
regulation, health and safety issues, product-standards, licencing,
and professional degree recognition."
Fiscal barriers are created by differing rates of indirect taxes,
including value added taxes (i.e., "VAT") and excise taxes.54 The
solution, a harmonization of rate schedules, has been difficult to
achieve. VAT rates on different product types have ranged from 1 %
in Belgium to 38 % in Italy, while averaged rates have ranged from
46. See Owen, supra note 43, at 89-91.
47. Schengen Accord SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET REPORTER, Jan. 1993 at 17:VI.
48. White Paper, supra note 40, arts. 13, 58; Nervell, supra note 23, at 201.
49. For a discussion of similar examples see Owen, supra note 43, at 63-85.
50. Nervell, supra note 23, at 201.
51. Europe Switches on to Sockets of the Future, THE EUROPEAN, Apr. 8, 1993 at 1;
Europlug Aims for a Perfect Fit, THE EUROPEAN, Apr. 8, 1993, at 4.
52. Owen, supra note 43, at 70-71.
53. Id. at 65-66.
54. White Paper, supra note 40, arts. 162, 165, 169; Nervell, supra note 23, at 201; see
KAPTEYN, supra note 11, at 368-75.
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12% in Spain and Luxembourg to 25 % in Ireland.55
In the autumn of 1992, the EC finally reached an agreement to
approximate VAT and excise taxes. 56 In particular, a legally binding
minimum VAT rate (effective Jan. 1993) was set at 15% .57 Speci-
fied eligible goods and services may qualify for lower rates. 58 States
with super-low or zero-rate VATs are given a transitional extention
to 1997 to comply.5 9
Another fiscal-type barrier is the cost involved in dealing with
multiple currencies. Different currencies, in themselves, constitute a
barrier. The difficulty of predicting long-term exchange rates and
other monetary policies of member states impedes economic coordi-
nation. The barrier created by transaction costs in exchanging cur-
rencies is another impediment illustrated by the fact that in the
1970s, a person passing through the then ten member states and re-
peatedly exchanging currency along the way retained only 53% of
the initial sum. 0
4. Evolution of "Harmonization" Theories
(a) Harmonization Philosophies-Lowest Common De-
nominator, Optimal, and Minimal Approaches.-Effective economic
and political integration is facilitated through development of har-
monized law. The extent of harmonization to be achieved has been a
major issue in the development of a single European market. Sub-
stantial debate has occurred as to what "harmonization" entails.
One approach, the so-called Lowest Common Denominator (LCD)
harmonization attempts to identify areas of similarity and then
adopt standards which are held in common by all of the member
states. In essence this becomes a "lowest common denominator" phi-
losophy of harmonization. Optijmal harmonization interjects the ele-
ment of defining a desirable or ideal standard to which all member
states' law should conform. In contrast to the LCD harmonization
approach, the optimal harmonization approach will necessarily in-
volve changes in the laws of member states to achieve newly defined
and desirable legal standards. A third approach referred to as mini-
mal harmonization recognizes the value of attempting to achieve a
desirable standard, but also recognizes that in many instances reten-
55. CALINGAERT, supra note 8, at 23.
56. EC Reaches Accord on VAT, Excise Taxes, EURECOM, Vol. 4, No. 10 (Nov. 1992);
Guide to VAT in 1993, ECSC-EEC-EAEC, Brussels/Luxembourg, 1992 by Commission of
European Communities.
57. EC Reaches Accord on VAT, supra note 56; Guide to VAT in 1993, supra note 56,
at 6.
58. EC Reaches Accord on VAT, supra note 56.
59. Id.; and Guide to VAT in 1993, supra note 56, at 1, 6.
60. CALINGAERT. supra note 8, at 7.
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tion of local option is necessary or desirable in the absence of some
overriding health, safety, or other similar concern which mandates
adoption of a uniform standard.61 Another illustration of "gradual-
ism" in operation is found in the movement by the European Com-
munity from the "lowest common denominator" to the optimal and
minimal harmonization approaches.62
EC member states, administrators, and legislators found over a
period of time the "lowest common denominator" method to be un-
satisfactory because problems which needed attention were not being
addressed. The movement toward an optimal harmonization philoso-
phy attempted to address these problem areas by providing stan-
dards. However, this process was unsuccessful in achieving the broad
basis of reform needed. It proved to be a slow and conservative pro-
cess because member states were unwilling in many instances to re-
linquish legislative sovereignty to the EC institutions." Basic ques-
tions seeking a new and more responsive methodology were asked
with increasing frequency, particularly after the 1985 White Paper,
the 1987 Single European Act, and adoption of the 1992 target date.
It became obvious that it would be impossible to achieve the Single
Market by 1992 if the traditional broad subject matter coverage and
unanimity techniques for identifying and implementing harmoniza-
tion goals were utilized. In point, the experience with the CISG
[Convention on the International Sale of Goods], which came to life
only after more than a half-century of effort by outstanding organi-
zations like UNIDROIT, the Hague Conference on International
Law and UNCITRAL, 64 demonstrates the difficulty inherent in us-
ing the traditional processes.65 Enactment of the vast scope of the
body of law and the regulatory scheme required to implement the
1992 Single Market target obviously could not be achieved in a
timely fashion under the traditional harmonization processes.
It became apparent that careful selection of areas in which har-
monization was essential and limitation of harmonization efforts to
these areas might be the road to realistic integration within reasona-
61. Anita Bernstein, L'Harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products Liability Attempted in the
European Community, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 673, 676-81, 695-96, 705 (1991).
62. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, at Part Three, Title 1, Chapter 3: Approximation of
Laws (as amended by Articles 17-19 of the Single European Act). For a general discussion of
European Community harmonization see Alan Dashwood, The Harmonization Process in
HARMONIZATION IN THE EEC 7 (Carol Cosgrove Twitchett ed., 1981).
63. Daniel Vignes, The, Harmonization of National Legislation and the EEC, 15 EUR.
L. REV. 358, 359 (1990).
64. Louis F. Del Duca, Developing Transnational Harmonization Procedures for the
Twenty-first Century in COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW-NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONS 28 (Cranston & Goode, eds., Oxford University Press, 1993); Arthur Rosett, Uni-
fication, Harmonization, Restatement, Codification and Reform in International Commercial
Law, 40 AM. J. oF COMP. L. 683 (1992).
65. Del Duca, supra note 64; Rosett, supra note 64.
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ble time frames. 6 Accordingly, "minimal harmonization" and "mu-
tual recognition" terminology became standard nomenclature in the
new "White Paper - Single Act - Single Market" 1992 era. One
might also note that the "minimal harmonization" and "mutual rec-
ognition" procedure is more compatible with the "subsidiarity" re-
quirement explicitly articulated in the Maastricht Treaty discussed
later in this article.
(b) Approach to Harmonization Prior to the Single Euro-
pean Act (Movement From The Lowest Common Denominator to
Optimal Harmonization Approach).-The term "harmonization" it-
self is not actually used in the English text of the Treaty of Rome.
Instead, article 100 of the Treaty uses the term "approximation." It
provides:
The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the
Commission, issue directives for the approximation of such pro-
visions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in
Member States as directly affect the establishment or function-
ing of the common market. [Emphasis supplied]67
The unanimity requirement of article 100 limited the effective-
ness of "approximation" efforts by conferring a veto power to every
member state. Moreover, since only "directives" were authorized to
be used to achieve ."approximation," the EC's harmonization power
was also curtailed because member states therefore retained the
right under article 189 of the Treaty of Rome to design their own
means and methods of implementing the Community stated goals
individual directives were to achieve. This strict interpretation of the
language of article 100 permits use only of "directives" and denied
use of other methods, such as "regulations," "recommendations" or
"decisions" to achieve harmonization. s Another weakhess of the
original article 100 implementation procedure was the tendency to
develop new rules on a product-by-product or segment-by-segment
portion of the affected groups. These procedures severely slowed the
harmonization efforts. For example, it took twenty-six years to pro-
mulgate a directive dealing with mutual recognition of architect di-
plomas, as contrasted with the few years that it more recently took
to promulgate a directive dealing with the mutual recognition of di-
plomas generally.6 9
66. Bernstein, supra note 61, at 695-96.
67. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, pt. three - Policy of the Community, Title I -
Common Rules, Chapter 3: Approximation of Laws, Article 100.
68. Vignes, supra note 63, at 358-359.
69. Del Duca, supra note 64, at 11; see also Council Directive 85/433 of Sept. 16, 1985
(regarding the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates, and formal qualifications in phar-
macy) O.J. No. L 253, 24/9/85, p.37; see Proposal for Council Directive on a General System
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Despite the limitations and cumbersome processes involved in
the pre-Single Act utilization of article 100, directives adopted were
nevertheless supreme law throughout the European Community
member states. 0 Furthermore, article 100 in one sense allowed a
wide scope, in that approximation directives could address any area
which directly affected the common market. Thus, the limitations
were not paralyzing, as evidenced by the passage of nearly two-hun-
dred article 100 directives (many of them based in addition on the
implied powers clause of Article 235 of the Treaty of Rome) prior to
the adoption of the Single European Act. 1
(c) Mutual Recognition - A Derivative of Articles 30,
34 and 36, and the European Court of Justice Case Law.-Articles
30 72 and 34,73 which prohibit quantitative restrictions on imports and
exports and "all measures having equivalent effect" between mem-
ber states, have also played an important role in the achievement of
European Community harmonization. However, the article 30 and
34 prohibitions are significantly curtailed by article 36, which cre-
ates exemptions for domestic regulations pertaining to
public morality, public policy or public security; the protection
of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of
national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological
value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property.74
However, classification into one of these "exempt" groupings does
not provide an absolute shield from Community law, as article 36
also requires that the legislation "may not constitute arbitrary dis-
crimination nor a hidden restriction" to commerce between member
states .
75
The article 30, 34, and 36 provisions serve as the basis of the
principle of mutual recognition as developed by the European Court
of Justice .7 Barring instances where domestic imperatives relating to
health, safety, and consumer protection are threatened, this principle
directs that national legislation of member states be mutually recog-
for Recognition of Higher Education Diplomas, COM (85) 355, O.J. No. C 217, 28/8/85, p.3;
Amended at COM (86) 257, O.J. No. C 143, 10/6/86, p. 7.
70. Commission v. Belgium Case 239/85 [1986] EC I CMLR 248 (1988); Commission
v. Italy Case 309/81 [1983] ECR 2 CMLR 430 (1984).
71. Vignes, supra note 63, at 367.
72. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, pt. two, tit. 1, Chapter 2: Elimination of Quantita-
tive Restrictions Between Member States, Article 30.
73. Id. art. 34.
74. Id. art. 36.
75. MENGOZZi, supra note 3, at 208-209.
76. Id. at 208-213; Rewe Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein
(case 120/78, ECR 649, 1979) known as the Cassis de Dijon case. See also KAPTEYN, supra
note 1,, at 469.
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nized in the absence of a Community standard.7 The Cassis de Di-
jon case initially confronted this issue.78 In Cassis, entry of a French
liqueur (Cassis de Dijon) into Germany was barred by a German
regulation that prohibited the import of liqueur that failed to contain
a minimum alcohol content. Germany classified the restriction as a
"6consumer protection" measure on the theory that German consum-
ers would tend to consume large amounts of low alcohol rather than
small amounts of high alcohol content liqueur to the detriment of
their health. The court rejected this argument concluding that the
German "minimum alcohol content" law was actually designed to
protect German producers and was not a consumer protection law.
The Court, in its deliberations, introduced the concept of mutual
recognition of national laws. It ruled that laws or regulations limit-
ing the free circulation of goods would be honored only if they "re-
spond[ed] to imperative requirements concerning . . . the efficacy of
tax controls, the protection of public health, loyalty to commercial
deals and the defense of consumers. '79 It found no genuine connec-
tion between bona fide consumer protection and the German "mini-
mum alcohol content" law. It also held that national rules must be
proportional to the imperative pursued. In the absence of a genuine
imperative, the German law could not restrict the movement of
goods as long as standards in the country of origin (France) were
satisfied. Thus, the concept of "mutual recognition" emerged to de-
fine the interrelationship between national laws. In general, a prod-
uct which complies with all standards, laws and regulations of its
home country, must be accepted by all other member states8" in the
absence of an applicable Community norm.
(d) White Paper - Single Act - Single Market 1992
(i) "Qualified Majority Approximation" - Amend-
ments to Article 100.-Achievement of harmonization was facili-
tated by the Single European Act of 1987 and adoption of articles
100a and 100b. Article 100a applied immediately for the achieve-
ment of an internal market by 1992. It provides:
The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal
from the Commission in cooperation with the European Parlia-
ment and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee,
adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member
77. Commission Report Com(90) 552 Final, Brussels, 23 November 1990, "Completing
the Internal Market" - Progress Report Required by Article 8b; at 20.
78. Rewe-Zentral AG, Case 120/78 [1979] ECR 649 2 CMLR 665 (1979), supra note
76.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see MENGOZZI, supra note 3, at 210.
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States which have as their object the establishment and func-
tioning of the internal market. [Emphasis supplied]8"
Article 100(a) facilitates achievement of "approximation" of
law by reducing the unanimous voting requirement to a "qualified
majority" and authorizing use of "measures" rather than only
"directives'"
A "qualified majority" is greater than a simple majority. It is a
super-majority, requiring fifty-four of the seventy-six weighted votes
of the Council. Nevertheless, use of a qualified majority procedure
eliminates the veto power inherent in a unanimity procedure, thereby
facilitating the decision-making process.
Under the "qualified majority" procedure votes are distributed
as follows: ten (10) votes to France, Italy, United Kingdom, West
Germany; eight (8) votes to Spain;five (5) votes to Belgium, Greece,
the Netherlands, Portugal; three (3) votes to Denmark, Ireland; two
(2) votes to Luxembourg.82 The "54 of 76" voting formula was un-
doubtedly meticulously negotiated. It requires twenty-three votes to
block enactment. Therefore, six of the seven smallest countries with
a total of twenty-three votes or all seven with a total of twenty-eight
votes could together block enactment of a proposal by the larger
countries. in addition, at least three larger countries would have to
band together to themselves block enactement of a measure by coun-
cil under article 100(a). This voting procedure will undoubtedly re-
quire a delicate rebalancing as new members are added to the Euro-
pean Community.
Harmonization is further facilitated by article 100(a) because
achievement of "approximation" is no longer confined to use of di-
rectives as it was under article 100, but rather expanded to permit
use of "measures."83 "Measures" includes directives, regulations or
recommendations. Therefore, under article 100(a), by duly promul-
gating regulations (which immediately have direct effect), Commu-
nity institutions can directly and uniformly control harmonization of
specified areas of the law, instead of having to rely on implementa-
tion by member states of duly promulgated directives. In addition,
recommendations issued by Community institutions, in an attempt to
harmonize, can now function as model law which member states
may immediately adopt.
(ii) Limitations on "Qualified Majority Approxima-
81. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, as amended by Article 18 of the Single European
Act, at Part Three - Policy of the Community, Title I -Common Rules, Chapter 3: Approxi-
mation of Laws, Article 100a.
82. Id. art. 148.
83. Vignes, supra note 63, at 370.
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tion".-Although the European Community has been given consid-
erable latitude and flexibility under article 100(a) to use these new
devices to achieve harmonization, article 100(a) also placed signifi-
cant limitations on the use of qualified majority voting. The unani-
mous vote requirement continues to be required for harmonization
measures regarding the movement of persons, and the rights of em-
ployed persons.84 In addition, all approximation proposals and mea-
sures taken pursuant to article 100(a) must "maintain a high level of
protection with regard to health, safety, environmental, and con-
sumer protection."8 5 Another limit is a safeguard clause permitting
temporary domestic measures to be taken by any state subject to the
approval of the Commission or other Community control procedures
for any non-economic reason provided under article 36.86
An additional significant limitation to the article 100a approxi-
mation power is that any member state which voted against a mea-
sure passed by a qualified majority is permitted to opt out and apply
its own national standards on article 36, environmental or work-
place protection grounds.8 However, comparable to the article 36
limitations on exemptions, the national standards may not constitute
arbitrary discrimination nor a disguised restriction on trade.8
These provisions requiring unanimous voting in specified areas
and authorizing member states to opt out of certain qualified voting
measures were deemed necessary to make possible the fundamental
transition from unanimity to a qualified majority voting procedure.8 9
(iii) Application of "Minimal Harmonization" Com-
bined with "Mutual Recognition" Procedure to Facilitate Achieve-
ment of "Single Market 1992".-During 1992, Article 100b took
effect. It provides:
During 1992, the Commission shall, together with each Member
State, draw up an inventory of national laws, regulations and
adriinistrative provisions which fall under Article 100a and
which have not been harmonized pursuant to that Article.
The Council, acting in accordance with the provisions of Article
100a, may decide that the provisions in force in a Member State
must be recognized as being equivalent to those applied by an-
other Member State.
90
This article apparently envisages Council utilizing article
84. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, at Article 100a(2).
85. Id. art. 100a(3).
86. Id. art. 100a(4) and (5).
87. Id.; see KAPTEYN, supra note II, at 474-75.
88. Vignes, supra note 63, at 366.
89. Id. at 367.
90. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art. 100b (emphasis added).
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100(a) procedures to provide for automatic and instantaneous har-
monization by the end of 1992. This "harmonization" may be af-
fected by Council through enactment of measures for approximation
or by identification of areas of the law deemed "equivalent."
"Equivalent" law must then be mutually recognized.
The practical consequences of the need to achieve the White
Paper goals in a five-year period created a need for harmonization
techniques which would produce immediate short-term results. This
urgency produced a facilitation in several major respects (e.g. the
article 100a "qualified majority" and "measure" standards), but has
simultaneously narrowed the reach of approximation measures re-
quiring unanimity (e.g. article 100a escape clause). In addition,
rather than struggling for standardization in all areas, an affirmative
emphasis has recently been placed on mutual recognition. The result
has been a new philosophy of harmonization, referred to as minimal
harmonization. It is justified by the fact that the Treaty of Rome
calls for approximation of law, not "harmonization," replication,
standardization, or imposition of exact uniformity. The overall strat-
egy is to harmonize by approximation the essential areas and to
standardize crucial European regulations. The remaining areas of
the law, national regulations and administrative practices not subject
to explicit Community rulemaking will be selected and mutually rec-
ognized, in such a manner that the differences will not produce detri-
ment to the single market.9 1
5. Maastricht (Monetary and Political Union).-The most
ambitious and recent step in European integration is the Treaty on
European Union signed at the European Committee Summit at
Maastricht in the Netherlands in December 1991.92 Inter alia, the
Treaty on European Union (hereafter TEU), addresses monetary
and political union, the two most sophisticated stages of integration.
Besides providing new nomenclature by substituting the term Euro-
pean Union in the place of European Community, the treaty maps
out the direction for Europe through the end of the century.93 Its
provisions are aimed at linking European states more closely to-
gether on economic, social, monetary, political and foreign policy
grounds. These ambitious goals generated difficulties in the ratifica-
tion process. Doubts have arisen as to the possibility of achieving
them within the targeted time frames. 94 An overview of these new
91. Vignes, supra note 63, at 365-66.
92. New European Union Treaty Signed at Maastricht, supra note 6.
93. David Buchan, A Heath Robinson Design for Europe, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1991,
Section 1, at 16.
94. Brummer, supra note 4, at 27; Peter Gumbel, Denmark ApproVes European Unity
Pact, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1993, at AI0; infra notes 110-127 and accompanying text.
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goals follows.
(a) Provision for Monetary Union.-Economic and Mon-
etary Union [EMU], envisioned by the Maastricht Treaty, involves a
three-phase approach. 95 The first phase began July 1990 with an ef-
fort to coordinate monetary policies. The second phase is scheduled
to begin January 1994, with the creation of the European Monetary
Institute [EMI]. Although the EMI will not have the powers of a
central bank, it will operate as an interim institution focusing on
tighter controls of exchange rate fluctuations. 96 The third stage is the
establishment of a single currency [ECU - European Currency
Unit] and of a Central European Bank. This Bank97 will have au-
thority to issue and manage the ECU, fix interest rates, and regulate
the money supply. Movement into the third phase is contingent as to
timing. It may occur as early as January 1996 if a majority of the
states meet "convergence" criteria, or as late as the 1999 automatic
deadline." The "convergence" criteria are standards relating to in-
flation rates, interest rates, government deficits, government debt and
currency stability. The end result would be one currency and one
bank for Europe. By a special "opt-out" provision, Britain and Den-
mark are permitted to defer their decision to join the monetary
union.99
(b) Political Union - Treaty Amendments
(i) New Areas of Legislative Competence.-Political
unification among the EC member states is promoted by several pro-
visions of the Maastricht Treaty. The legislative role of the Euro-
pean Parliament is expanded. The overall competence of the Euro-
pean Community in eleven areas is introduced or reinforced. These
areas include education, health, training, consumer protection, trans-
European networks, development cooperation, environmental policy,
social policy, research and development, industrial competition and
culture.1"' This affirmative authorization broadens the legislative
powers of the European Community, moving additional political
95. Treaty on European Union, supra note 5; see also Alan Riding, The European Sum-
mit; Measured Steps Toward One Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1991, at AI8, col. 2.
96. Summary of EC Economic and Political Union Treaty, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
December 8, 1991.
97. EC Leaders Vow to Press Ahead Toward Unity, FACTS ON FILE: WORLD NEWS
DIGEST, July 9, 1992, at 51 1-C2.
98. Riding, supra note 95, at 18.
99. Buchan, supra note 93, at 16.
100. Treaty on European Union, supra note 5, arts. 118, 123, 125-130 (European Par-
liament, arts. 137, 138b, c; education, arts. 126, 127; health, art. 129; training, art. 127; con-
sumer protection, art. 129a; trans-European network, art. 129b-d; development cooperation,
art. 130u-y; environmental policy, art. 130r-t; social policy, arts. 118a, 123, 125; research and
development, aArt. 130f-p; industrial competition, art. 130; and culture, art. 128).
[Vol. 11:3
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY EXPERIENCE
power out of the individual states and into the central "Union." 101
(ii) European Social Community.-Ten of the Euro-
pean states (with Britain not in agreement and Denmark given a
comparable exemption on the second Maastricht Treaty ratification
vote) agreed to "opt-in" to a protocol establishing a European Social
Community. 02 In this context the word "social" essentially means
"labor". The European Social Community will operate by using the
European Community institutions to promulgate rules relating to
health and safety, work-place conditions, gender equality in the em-
ployment context, and integration of persons excluded from the labor
market. In addition, unanimous approval will allow legislation on so-
cial security, unemployment protection, employment of non-E.C. na-
tionals, and representation of workers and employers. 0 3 Although
Britain's representatives will continue to function in the Parliament,
Commission and Court relating to these matters, they are excluded
from participation in the Council."' Having said this, it is important
to note that the Treaty of Rome as amended already gives the Euro-
pean Community significant power in this area of the law. This ex-
isting "labor law" framework remains in place.
(iii) European Citizenship.-Another important move
toward political union is the conferral of European Citizenship to
nationals of all member states by the Maastricht Treaty. The impli-
cations of this naturalization are three-fold. First, it confers the right
to reside in, and the freedom to move between member states. Sec-
ond, it entails the right to vote and stand as a political candidate for
local elections. Third, a union citizen in a non-EC country shall be
entitled to diplomatic and consular protection of any member
state.1
0 5
(c) Political Union - Common Foreign and Security
Policy.-Common Foreign and Security Policy is another important
step toward political union. The EC institutions will have binding
authority with respect to the CSCE process (Conference on Security
101. Treaty on European Union, supra note 5, at Art. C; New European Union Treaty
Signed at Maastricht, supra note 7, at 2.
102. Treaty on European Union, supra note 5, at Protocol on Social Policy; Buchan,
supra note 93, at 16; Gumbel, supra note 93.
103. Treaty on European Union, supra note 5, at Agreement on Social Policy concluded
between the Member States of the European Community with the exception of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, art. 2; see New European Union Treaty
Signed at Maastricht, supra note 6, at 2.
104. Treaty on European Union, supra note 5, at Protocol on Social Policy; see also
Buchan, supra note 92, at 16.
105. Treaty on European Union, supra note 5, art. 8, 8a-c; see also New European
Union Treaty Signed at Maastricht, supra note 6, at 3.
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and Cooperation in Europe). This is essentially a diplomatic tool
through which the EC nations may speak with one voice. EC author-
ity has also been extended to disarmament and control of armaments
in Europe, as well as to nonproliferation of economic aspects of
security.106
The provisions also foresee the formulation of foreign and com-
mon defense policies through the European Council rather than the
European Community, Commission, Parliament, and Council Insti-
tutions. This objective will be pursued through the use of a long-
standing military pact which has been historically inactive: The
Western European Union [WEU]. The WEU, whose membership
includes nine of the twelve European Community states, shall at-
tempt to develop a European identity in terms of security and de-
fense, increase European security and defense roles and responsibili-
ties, and promote Atlantic Alliance.1"7 In 1998, after several
additional years of focusing on these goals and on expanded mem-
bership, the European Union will formally assess the future of the
WEU.108
(d) Political Union - Judicial and Internal Affairs.-As
to internal policy, the treaty seeks to achieve parallel treatment in
areas in which Community states have a joint and common interest.
These areas are divided into five categories and identified in the
Maastricht Treaty. They include: (1) asylum policy; (2) immigra-
tion policy; (3) drug trafficking; and organized crime; (4) EURO-
POL - a union wide police information exchange system, and (5)
fraud detection. These areas of common interest and concern have
been deemed appropriate targets for law imposed from a central
Community source rather than from a myriad of domestic sources.10 9
(e) Ratification of Maastricht- "Subsidiarity".-The
Maastricht Treaty has to be ratified by each member state of the
European Community in order to enter into force. Each member
state has its own constitutional procedure for ratification of a treaty.
In Denmark, France, and Ireland ratification was to be by a popular
vote referendum. In the remaining nine states ratification was to be
in their respective national legislatures.110 In June 1992, Denmark,
106. Treaty on European Union, supra note 5, at Title V; New European Union Treaty
Signed at Maastricht, supra note 7, at 3.
107. Treaty on European Union, supra note 5, art. J.4; New European Union Treaty
Signed at Maastricht, supra note 7, at 3.
108. Treaty on European Union, supra note 5, art. J.4.
109. Treaty on European Union, supra note 5, art. K.1; New European Union Treaty
Signed at Maastricht, supra note 7, at 3.
110. William Tuohy, Danish Voters Reject Treaty Uniting Europe, L.A. TIMES, June 3,
1992, at Al, col.3.
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the third smallest state in the Community (representing only 1.5 %
of the total Community population) rejected Maastricht by referen-
dum with a slim 50.7 % majority. This result came as a surprise, as
the Danish Parliament holds a strong 80% majority support for
Maastricht."'
There is some belief that Denmark's rejection was "sympto-
matic" of a growing sentiment in Europe.112 For example, Britain's
reluctance to join the monetary union and the European Social Com-
munity demonstrate a lack of enthusiasm for increased European
unity. Moreover, there are indications of an erosion of German com-
mitment to the new pace of integration. 1 3 In particular, opposition is
strong against giving up the deutchmark and what is deemed to be
continual financing of the European Community. Germans pay the
most into the Community - almost one-third of the total budget -
and receive the lowest rate of return on the amount contributed -
fifty percent. Ireland is receiving six times as it pays in. This type of
statistic appears to be wearing on German enthusiasm, especially in
the context of the financial burden involved in absorbing the impov-
erished East German state in the reunification process. Additionally,
a very thin majority referendum vote in France favoring ratification
is also cited as evidence of declining enthusiasm for the Maastricht
Treaty.1
4
Ireland, by referendum in June 1992, accepted the Maastricht
Treaty by a sixty-nine percent majority." 5 This was to be expected
in light of the substantial subsidies Ireland has received from the
Community since it became a member in 1973. Most recently, the
Community has committed $5 billion to Ireland in the three years
leading to 1993.6
Because the Danish rejection frustrated the required unanimity
for ratification by member states, a solution to potential deadlock
became a primary topic of European Community summits through-
out 1992." 7 At the June summit in Lisbon, Portugal, concern was
expressed that Maastricht may have been too progressive and some-
11. David Buchan, Danes Say No To Maastricht Treaty, FIN. TIMES, June 3, 1992, at
2.
112. Joel Havemann and Tyler Marshall, Germans' Support for a Unified Europe is
Sliding, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 1992, at 1, col. 2, World Report.
113. Id.
114. France Says "Oui" to Maastricht, EURECOM, vol. 4, no. 9 (Oct. 1992).
115. James F. Clarity, Irish Vote Backs European Treaty, Giving New Life to Plan for
Unity, NY TIMES, June 20, 1992, at 1, Section 1, col.l.
116. EC Leaders Vow to Press Ahead Toward Unity, supra note 96, at 511-C2;
"Greece Endorses Maastricht Pact," WASH. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1992, at A12; European Chiefs
Stem Threats to Unity, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 1992 at 36, col. 1.
117. EC Leaders Vow to Press Ahead Toward Unity, supra note 97, at 511 -C2; Euro-
pean Chiefs Stem Threats to Unity, supra note 116, at 36; EC Leaders Resolve Crisis on
Denmark, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1992, at A37, col. 4; Summit's task is to tackle people's
urgent concerns, THE EUROPEAN, Oct. 15, 1992, at 8.
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what premature.118 During the formal proceedings, emphasis was
placed on the concept of "subsidiarity" as a means to salvage Maas-
tricht." 9 Subsidiarity directs that the European Community institu-
tions enact legislation only when the Community itself, rather than
national, regional or local governments is better suited to do So.1
2 0
The Birmingham summit in October, 1992 yielded an understanding
that subsidiarity would effect a "devolution of powers from Brus-
sels."' 21 The concept of subsidiarity (explicity provided for in the
Maastricht Treaty) was explicitly reaffirmed and embraced in a for-
mal declaration by the December 1992 summit in Edinborough,
Scotland.
122
There was also extensive and serious talk of attaining union by
means of a "two-speed" or "two-tier" approach 2 3 on grounds that
this procedure would provide increased flexibility, allowing member
nations to evolve toward union at differing speeds.124 Proponents ar-
gued that stronger and wealthier nations could be placed on a faster
track than weaker and poorer nations. Others noted the possibility of
differentiating nations who accept Maastricht in full from those who
are exempted from portions of the agreement, such as Denmark and
Britain, who have been granted exemptions from Maastricht.'25 Den-
mark held another referendum on Maastricht on May 18, 1993 (mi-
nus the single currency, common defense and European citizenship
provisions) which produced a favorable vote of fifty-six percent.
2
1
Constitutional challenges to the Treaty brought by Lord Rees-Mogg
were ruled invalid by the British High Court. Subsequent to the de-
cision by Lord Rees-Mogg not to appeal, the British government won
its vote of confidence in the House of Commons on opting-out of the
Treaty's social chapter and ratified the Maastricht Treaty on August
2, 1993. With the U.K.'s ratification, eleven of the twelve EC mem-
ber states had ratified the Maastricht Treaty. As this article goes to
press, a decision by an eight judge panel of Germany's federal Con-
stitutional court has rejected agreements that the Treaty is undemo-
118. EC Leaders Vow to Press Ahead Toward Unity, supra note 97, at 511-C2.
119. EC Leaders Knock Heads on Union Treaty, USA TODAY, June 27, 1992, at 4A,
(Wire Reports), International Edition.
120. Treaty on European Union, supra note 5, at Title I1, Article 3b; EC Leaders Vow
to Press Ahead Toward Unity, supra note 96, at 511-C2; Renaud Dehousse, Does Sub-
sidiarity Really Matter?, Eur. U. Inst. Working Paper Law No. 92-32.
121. Summit Aims to Calm the People's Fear, THE EUROPEAN, Oct. 15, 1992, at 1.
122. European Chiefs Stem Threats to Unity, supra note 116, at 36.
123. Id.; Summit Aims to Calm the People's Fear, supra note 121, at 1; Clinton Must
Widen Focus to World Economic Issues, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1992, at HI.
124. Id.; European Chiefs Stem Threats to Unity, supra note 116, at 36; EC Leaders
Resolve Crisis on Denmark, supra note 117, at A37; Summit Aims to Calm the People's
Fear, supra note 121, at 1.
125. European Chiefs Stem Threats to Unity, supra note 116, at 36; EC Leaders Re-
solve Crisis on Denmark, supra note 117, at A37.
126. Id.; Gumbel, supra note 94.
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cratic and that it deprived Germany of its basic sovereign rights. So
ruling, the court held that the Treaty is compatible with the German
Constitution, thereby clearing the way for the controversial Treaty
to come into force throughout the Community on November 1,
1993.7
6. Distinguishing Characteristics of the European Commu-
nity.-Predominant features of the European Community set it
apart from other regional organizations. The legislative mechanisms
are the first of these distinguishing features. They supplement treaty
law by drafting and adopting various forms of Community legisla-
tion through a process analogous to a legislature operating within the
framework of a constitution. Although the European Community
legislative process is more complicated than most legislative
processes and involves more intricate deliberation, negotiation, and
compromise to reach the consensus necessary for adoption, the final
product is nevertheless supreme law throughout the European Com-
munity member states.
128
The character of Community law, unique in its breadth, is the
second primary feature setting the EC apart from other regional or-
ganizations. Its scope permits it to govern intrinsically domestic ar-
127. U.K. Ratifies Maastricht, 5 EURECOM 3 (Sept. 1993); Erik Ipsen, U.K. Ruling
Brakes EC's Halting Pace Toward Unity; Court Agrees to Review Case Calling Maastricht
Constitutionally Flawed, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 20, 1993; UK Gov't. Wins Confidence
Vote: Official, AFX NEWS, July 23, 1993; EC Aims to Implement Maastricht Treaty Nov. 1,
AFX NEWS, July 23, 1993. On July 30, 1993 the British High Court rejected argument that
the British government acted unlawfully by seeking to ratify the Treaty without Parliament
approval. R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Lord
Rees-Mogg, Q.B., Aug. 3, 1993, CO/2040/93 (Transcript: John Larking). Robert Rice, High
Court Rejects Maastricht Challenge, FIN. TIMES WEEKEND, July 31/Aug. 1, 1993, at 7.
In reporting the decision of the federal constitutional court (Bundesverfassungsgericht),
the Wall Street Journal advises that
Belgium, which holds the community's rotating presidency, immediately an-
nounced a special summit of EC leaders for Oct. 29 in Brussels and said the
pact would come into force Nov. I. The leaders are expected to select a site for a
new European Monetary Institute, which under the Maastricht accord comes
into being next January to coordinate phase two of the EC's plan for economic
and monetary union. Frankfurt is considered the favorite to house the institute,
which is seen as the forerunner of a central European bank.
Even with the ratification debate settled, the Maastricht Treaty isn't likely to
usher in the far-reaching promises made by its authors. It could take years
before main provisions are actually implemented. In particular, the backbone of
the document, a plan to create a single European currency before the end of the
century, is now widely considered unrealistic, especially since the practical col-
lapse of Europe's currency-exchange grid this summer.
Mark M. Nelson & Charles Goldsmith, Maastricht Treaty Doesn't Conflict With German
Law, Court Says-Ruling Paves Way for EC's Contested Pact to Come Into Force Next
Month, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 1993, at A19; Quentin Peel & Lionel Barber, German court
gives approval to Maastricht, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1993, at 1.
128. Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585, CMLR 425.(1964) (establishing the Supremacy
of Community Law over conflicting law of member states).
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eas. In effect, EC promulgated law may deal with administrative,
environmental, taxation, labor, consumer protection, and any other
economically relevant area. Its application may extend to cross-bor-
der as well as strictly internal national law. This feature facilitates
potential expansion of the Community. Beginning conservatively,
this authorization allows the European Community to govern in-
creasingly broader areas of activity as the Community evolves.
Another significant feature of the European Community is the
European Court of Justice [hereinafter ECJ]. Rather than an ad hoc
mediation or arbitration panel or court with a non-compulsory juris-
diction which treaties often create, the ECJ is a permanent-standing
court with compulsory jurisdiction. Disputes brought before the
court subject the parties to its jurisdiction with decisions binding on
all parties. The cumulative body of ECJ cases has developed a
unique body of Community law. This process differs from the type of
dispute resolution usually created in the international area which
only serves to resolve immediate controversies and does not create a
body of binding legal precedent. The ECJ, in addition to resolving
controversies, formulates law. Although the Court is not strictly
bound by prior decisions, case law is often given precedential ef-
fect. 1 9 This also differs from the general approach of Civil Law
courts, and more closely resembles the "stare decisis" approach of
Common Law courts.
III. The Anatomy of Other Regional Organizations
A. European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
The European Free Trade Association [hereinafter EFTA]
Treaty was created in 1960.130 This European association, existing
contemporarily with the European Community, originated with
seven member states: Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Although the EFTA lost Den-
mark, Portugal and the United Kingdom to the EC by 1972 and
1986 Accession Treaties, EFTA gained the subsequent memberships
of Iceland, Finland and Liechtenstein.'' The EFTA, unlike the EC,
was merely a free trade area whose members retained sovereignty
within an organization in which cooperation was confined to mutual
reduction of tariffs."3 EFTA looked to free trade and increased com-
petition while the EC looked to economic integration and unity
through the transfer of sovereign rights to supranational institutions.
129. MENGOZZI, supra note 3, at 138-39.
130. Nervell, supra note 23, at 185.
131. Id. at 185-86.
132. Press Summary, Opinion 1/91, COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-,
TIES, Dec. 16, 1991 (Regarding European Economic Area).
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With free trade as the ultimate objective, the EFTA states did not
have long range goals to increase their level of integration. The
EFTA as an entity had no dealings with the EC. However bilateral
agreements were made between the EC and the individual EFTA
countries.3 ' In fact, these agreements rendered trade in industrial
products free of customs duties by 1977. Moreover, nearly all tariffs
and quantitative restrictions were abolished by 1987.
EFTA's purely economic objectives of integration have been
categorized into four groupings: (1) market orientation in the finan-
cial sector; (2) liberalization of financial markets; (3) growth of cap-
ital markets; and (4) increased and enhanced competition. 34 EFTA
saw an opportunity to further augment these aspects of economic
growth through collaboration with the EC. Therefore, in June 1990,
negotiations began between the EC and the EFTA to create a singu-
lar European Economic Area [hereinafter EEA].135 Unlike the EC,
the EFTA does not possess competence to enter into binding interna-
tional agreements. 136 However, for purposes of EEA negotiation, the
EFTA countries have agreed to speak through the single voice of the
association.
The Luxembourg Accord creating the EFA brings together
twelve EC nations and seven EFTA nations, - a total of 374 million
people, representing 47.2% of all world trade, - into the largest
and richest free trade area in the world. 137 Although previous bilat-
eral agreements had permitted the free flow of goods between EC
and EFTA countries, the EEA was scheduled to facilitate the free
flow of services, labor and capital, beginning January 1, 1993. Essen-
tially, EFTA nations may reap the economic benefits of the EC mar-
ket without actual membership in the EC. Thus, the four freedoms
central to the Europe 1992 programme (free movement of (1) goods
(2) people (3) services, and (4) capital) will be extended to the
EFTA nations. 138 In turn, although the EFTA nations are not re-
quired to join the EC, they are required to adopt the "aquis com-
munautaire" (all EC directives, regulations and case law formulated
since 1957).
The EEA does not address issues such as single currency, mu-
133. Nervell, supra note 23, at 186.
134. E.P.M. Gardener, The European Free Trade Association and the European Com-
munity, 25 INT'L LAW. 187, 191 (1991).
135. Id. at 193.
136. Nervell, supra note 23, at 204.
137. R.C. Longworth, Europe Accord a Catalyst for Regional Trade Blocks, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 24, 1991, at 1, Business Section, Zone C.
138. The EC/EFTA Agreement on the Creation of An European Economic Area
(EEA), EUROPEAN LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS BULLETIN. BAKER AND McKENZIE (Jan. 1992);
MENGOZZI, supra note 2, at 260, 293; MATHIJSEN, infra note 318, at 290; STEINER, infra note
322, at 6.
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tual foreign policy, common taxation, common agricultural policy,
nor common external tariffs. 139 The EEA common market is only a
free trade and not a customs union.
The institutions of the EEA include an EEA Council, EEA
Joint Committee, and (as initially approved) an EEA Court.1 40 The
Council, made up of the EC Council, EC Commission and a repre-
sentative from each EFTA government, performs the overall surveil-
lance of EEA. The Committee, comprised of representatives from all
participating nations, essentially provides a forum for the exchange
of views. The proposed court system entailed a high EEA Court with
eight-judges (five from the European Court of Justice, three from
EFTA nations) and an EEA Court of First Instance with five judges
(two from the European Community Court of First Instance and
three nominated from EFTA states)."" In litigation before the ECJ
the proposed EEA Court has been held violative of the Treaty of
Rome as amended. 42
The issue of dispute resolution by the formation of an EEA
Court system proved to be a highly sensitive area with the EC for
several reasons. First, the EC states did not want outside parties us-
ing their ECJ. But, the alternative, to submit themselves to an exter-
nal judicial forum, was equally undesirable." 3 Not only would the
EC lose some decisional power by allowing three EFTA-justice posi-
tions on the EEA high court, but also consistent interpretation of
Community law and principles would be jeopardized. Concluding
that the creation of an EEA Court would violate the Treaty of
Rome, the ECJ noted that the EEA Court and the ECJ could reach
different conclusions on points of law. In such cases, not only would
the exclusive supremacy of the ECJ be undermined, but also Com-
munity law would be damaged because of loss of consistency, pre-
dictability and integrity.'44 The ECJ subsequently held that an alter-
native to the EEA Court in the form of an arbitration dispute
resolution process would not be violative of the Treaty of Rome as
amended.'"
The future outlook for the EFTA seems to indicate more exten-
sive incorporation into the EC. However, rejection of the EEA by
139. BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 138; MENGOZZI, supra note 3, at 260; STEINER
infra note 322, at 6.
140. BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 138; MENGOZZI, supra note 3, at 260; STEINER,
infra note 322, at 6.
141. Press Summary Opinion 1/91, supra note 132.
142. Re The Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area (Opinion 1/91), 1 C.M.L.R.
245 (1992); EFTA, SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET REPORTER (Jan. 1993) at 21:VI-21:V3.
143. Nervell, supra note 23, at 187-88.
144. EFTA, supra note 142.
145. Id.; Re The Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area (No. 2) (Opinion 1/92), 2
C.M.L.R. 217 (1992).
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Swiss voters in a referendum has required adjustments to the EEA
to facilitate creation of an EEA consisting of the twelve EC member
states and the EFTA states minus Switzerland. Individually, EFTA
states are seriously considering application for EC membership. Ice-
land is actually the only EFTA state not considering EC member-
ship.14 The EEA would only give the EFTA states a free trade rela-
tionship with the EC. Full membership in the EC would give them a
customs union relationship with the EC and entitle the new member
to full participation in the institutional and committee economic and
political process.
Austria was the first EFTA nation to apply for membership to
the European Community in July 1989.147 With a sound economy, a
stable democracy, and compatible links with the EC member states,
Austria is an excellent candidate. The question of whether Austria's
neutralityis compatible with the political union envisioned by the
EC has been much discussed. Entry by 1995 appears to be probable.
Switzerland, also a neutral nation and claiming the world's
highest per capita income, has indicated interest in joining the
EC.14' Norway, with its strong economy and democratic traditions,
has excellent potential for EC membership, but continues to struggle
politically with the issue.149 In 1972, Norway was actually accepted
for entry, but in a national referendum its citizens voted against rati-
fication. Sweden applied for membership in July 1991 and Finland
applied in 1992. European Community leaders meeting in Copenha-
gen in June 1993 reaffirmed their 1992 Edinburgh Summit meeting
commitment to admit Sweden, Norway, Finland and Austria as new
members as of January 1995. In its capacity as President of the EC
during the second half of 1993, Belgium has expressed reservations
as to whether these admissions can be accomplished in the eighteen-
month time frame.150
B. North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA)
1. Prospects for Tri-lateral NAFTA.-In the late 1980s and
early 1990s, GATT experienced. serious difficulties in achieving
agreement on the Uruguay round of tariff reductions. 51 Nations be-
gan to look to regional trade organizations to perform GATT func-
146. James Bye and Paul Lansing, New Membership and the Future of the European
Community, 15 WORLD COMPETITION L. AND ECON. REV. 59, 60 (March 1992).
147. Id. at 63.
148. Id. at 64.
149. Id. at 65-66.
150. Id. at 67; Rory Watson & Victor Smart, Belgium Faces its First Test, THE EURO-
PEAN, June 25, 1993, at 1.
151. Gordon Ritchie, Beyond the Volcano - The Canadian Perspective on Trilateral
Free Trade, 26 COLUM. J. WORLD BUSINESS 82, 84 (Summer 1991).
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tions on a smaller, and thus more manageable scale. Their primary
focus is asserted to be opening trade between members, not on clos-
ing out external trade. Regionalism accordingly is deemed not to in-
herently lead to "fortresses" of protectionism.1 52
Canada, the United States, and Mexico have negotiated the
NAFTA agreement which awaits ratification by the three nations.
Lateral agreements on labor, environmental and other concerns are
likely to be appended to the treaty before it is submitted for ratifica-
tion. The motivations for such an alignment are multifaceted.' 53 In
part, frustration with GATT in expanding international trade has
led the nations of North America to negotiate among themselves.
The desire to maintain competitiveness in a world of developing re-
gional blocs - EC (European Community), LAFTA (Latin Ameri-
can Free Trade Association), ASEAN (Association of South East
Asian Nations), CACM (Central American Common Market), An-
dean Pact, among others is also a motivating factor. Access to vari-
ous natural and energy resources and an expanded free market area
with potential increases in standards of living are relevant
considerations.
Proponents argue that the interfacing of United States, Cana-
dian, and Mexican resources would present opportunities for exten-
sive growth. Canada and the United States are economically similar
in that they are both industrialized, developed, politically stable,
technologically advanced, and wealthy.154 Mexico, in contrast, is un-
derdeveloped and primarily agricultural, with widespread poverty
and a very low per capita income.1 55 Proponents contend that this
differential does not impede economic integration because "the law
of comparative advantage" and the "principle of economics-of-scale"
contribute to overall expansion and growth. 56
The "law of comparative advantage," shifts economic activity
toward the most available and efficient resources, maximizing pro-
duction and utility. 5 All three North American nations have sub-
stantial resources. However, the United States and Canada possess
greater reserves of capital and technology, whereas Mexico possesses
widespread low-cost labor. It is argued that integration of these
strengths allows each nation to increase the value and economic util-
152. Rudiger Dornbusch, North American Free Trade - What it Means, 26 COLUM. J.
WORLD BUSINESS 72, 75 (Summer 1991).
153. Neil Longley & Terry Wu, The US-Canada Free Trade Agreement - A Model
for a US-Mexico Free Trade Pact?, 26 COLUM. J. WORLD BUSINESS 60, 62-63 (Summer
1991).
154. Id. at 67.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 67-68.
157. Id. at 67.
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ity of its own resources. In simplified terms, this economic principle
merely directs each nation to contribute that which it most effec-
tively and efficiently produces. Nations with differing strengths and
resources can therefore cooperatively thrive under this principle. On
the other hand, "the economics-of-scale" principle can be best ap-
plied among similarly developed nations as it allows for longer pro-
duction runs, greater specialization and larger volumes. 158 This prin-
ciple is at work between Canada and the United States under the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement which has been effec-
tive between them since 1989.
Regional cooperation between nations of varying wealth is facil-
itated as procedures are developed which enable integration attempts
to benefit all parties. NAFTA is not the first regional organization to
consider merging such nations. The membership status given by the
industrialized and developed European Community nations to the
poorer nations of Portugal, Greece and Spain resulted in mutual ad-
vantage. 159 Recently, the European Community has even considered
affiliate memberships for the former-Eastern Bloc nations. In part
this decision recognized that areas where governments cease in-
terventionist policies and encourage privatization are ripe for ex-
panded trade and investment despite existing economic
underdevelopment.160
In addition to the economic advantages of integration, propo-
nents argue that allowing trade access also helps reduce the enor-
mous migration pressure which exists when a rich nation borders a
capital-poor and technologically-poor nation filled with low-cost la-
bor."6' They conclude that keeping the trade walls up encourages
illegal-alien entry.
Broader global issues are also triggered by NAFTA. 162 It is ar-
gued that NAFTA has the potential to effect a relocation of produc-
tion and manufacturing from Asia to North America. Like Asia,
Mexico possesses widespread low-cost labor. However, Mexico has
the added advantage of lower transportation costs, because goods do
not have to be shipped across the Pacific Ocean in order to reach
U.S. markets. NAFTA also could be a catalyst for broader hemi-
spheric integration as envisioned by former U.S. President Bush's
"Enterprise for the Americas."1 68 Finally, NAFTA could be a posi-
te step in t...e direction of a.pcn mlultilatelial gluobal sysiem, as the
158. Longley & Wv, supra note 153, at 68.
159. Dornbusch, supra note 152, at 74.
160. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
10 (1992).
161. Dornbusch, supra note 152, at 74.
162. Id.
163. Dornbusch, supra note 152.
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merits of free trade between economically distinct nations are
illustrated.
From Canada's perspective, NAFTA negotiations are viewed as
an opportunity to iron out some aspects of the Canada-United States
Free Trade Area [FTA]. 6 The seven principal areas of concern are
(1) rules of origin (minimum percentage of North American labor
and materials contributed to a product for it to qualify as North
American for FTA-rules treatment165); (2) subsidies; (3) dispute set-
tlement; (4) government procurement; (5) services; (6) temporary
entry; and (7) energy. These are the areas identified by proponents
of NAFTA as those which require tuning. Opposition groups of
NAFTA assert that "tuning" is inadequate and that major additions
and adjustments are necessary to avoid serious problems.116 Their
areas of concern include capital flight, dislocation of United States
labor, environmental contamination, and exploitation of Mexican la-
bor. The solution they offer typically involves twenty- or thirty-year
phase-in periods, multiple exclusions and escape clauses, and rigid
health, labor and environmental standards. While safety nets are no
doubt useful, concern has been expressed that overextended use of
safety nets may dilute the purpose and advantages of a free trade
area.1
6 7
The shaping of NAFTA began with the Free Trade Area
formed between Canada and the United States. It continues with the
completion of a tri-lateral NAFTA agreement, signed by the heads-
of-state in December 1992 and currently undergoing the addition of
pending "lateral agreements" in anticipation of formal considera-
tions for ratification by each member state. 68
2. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (F.T.A.).-In
January 1988, the United States and Canada signed a Free Trade
Agreement [hereinafter FTA] to go into effect January 1, 1989.169
The negotiations, which began with the Shamrock Summit in 1985,
followed a long history of economic relations between the two na-
164. Ritchie, supra note 151, at 86.
165. David Ivanovich, Trade Talks to Hit Peripheral Issues, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb.
17, 1992, at 1, Business Section.
166. Longley, supra note 153, at 69-70.
167. Id. at 71.
168. Keith Bradsher, Bush, Salinas and Mulroney to Sign Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 4, 1992, at 1, Section D; Bill Mintz, Bush to Sign North American Trade Pact, Hous-
TON CHRON., Dec. 4, 1992, at 1, Business Section; Bush Set to Sign Pact With Mexico, AT-
LANTA CONST., Dec. 4, 1992, at 7, Section D; see Matt Moffett, Mexicans Anticipate Passage
of Trade Pact Will Lift Economy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1993, at AI; Peter Behr, New Pow-
ers Sought for Trade Pact, WASH. POST, May 14, 1993, at DI. See also infra note 224.
169. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1989); see Ann
Carlsen, The Canada United States Free Trade Agreement: A Bilateral Approach to the Re-
duction of Trade Barriers, 12 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 299 (1989).
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tions.170 In fact, in 1987, trade in goods between the United States
and Canada amounted to $130 billion and trade in services was $30
billion.1 71 Furthermore, Canada and the United States are each
others largest trading partner.17 2 Proponents maintain that creation
of a free trade area, by eliminating trade barriers, will produce bene-
fits due to the resulting economy-of-scale and increased specializa-
tion. Tariffs existing between the two states are planned to be en-
tirely removed by 1998.173 Besides working toward the free flow of
goods, the FTA also attempts to facilitate the free flow of services.'17
Services have been a far more sensitive area than goods since ser-
vices such as financial, telecommunications, and transportation es-
sentially support the economic infrastructure. Canadian apprehen-
sion stems from a fear of United States domination over Canadian
national identity and sovereignty. A potent political cry in Canada
warns that the FTA is merely the first step in transforming Canada
into the fifty-first US state. 17 5 Nevertheless, treatment equivalent to
that granted to domestic national companies was accorded to speci-
fied covered services: agriculture, forestry, mining, construction, dis-
tributive trades, insurance, real estate, commercial services, com-
puter services, tourism, and enhanced telecommunications. 17 6 On the
other hand, a number of service industries and professions were ex-
plicitly excepted due to their sensitive nature: transportation, cul-
tural industries, (e.g., television, film, recording) basic telecommuni-
cations, medical doctors, dentists, lawyers, child care, and
government services.
The agreement also set up an institutional structure to deal with
the operation of the Free Trade Area. 7 This structure has been
largely incorporated into the tri-lateral NAFTA agreement.
3. NAFTA - Addition of Mexico.-By 1991, Mexico was
the United States' third-largest trading partner. 78 Sharing a 1900-
mile border from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean, 7 9 Mexico
and the United States have a long involved history of interaction. In
fact, it is estimated that approximately fifty percent of all Mexicans
170. Carlsen, supra note 169, at 305-308.
171. Robert A. McCormick, The US/Canada Free Trade Agreement in Perspective, 3
DET. C. L. REV. 785, 786 (Fall 1989).
172. Longley & Wv, supra note 153, at 61.
173. Carlsen, supra note 169, at 311.
174. Id. at 325-27.
175. McCormick, supra note 171, at 787.
176. Carlsen, supra note 169, at 326-27.
177. Id. at 316.
178. Longley & Wv, supra note 153, at 61.
179. International Boundary Lines of the United States, THE WORLD ALMANAC 1990,
424 (Scripps Howard Co, 1989).
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have a close relative living in the United States. 180
Mexico, unlike the United States, has suffered under conditions
of one party government, economic underdevelopment, and wide-
spread poverty. The Mexican government practiced interventionist
and protectionist policies,181 which at their height during the Lopez
Portillo administration confronted Mexico with a three-fold shock 8 '
in the form of (1) a debt crisis; (2) a dramatic fall in oil prices
(Mexico's largest export at the time was oil); and (3) huge capital
flight. In response, Mexico pursued radical economic reforms under
the direction of Mexican President Carlos Salinas during the latter
part of the 1980s. 181
Mexico's transformation entailed an abandonment of state-
planned economics and an adoption of a market-oriented ap-
proach.' 84 As a gesture and symbol to the international community
of this new commitment, Mexico joined the GATT in 1986.185 Si-
multaneously, tariffs were dramatically lowered. In particular, the
maximum tariff rates were reduced from one hundred percent to
twenty percent.' 86 Furthermore, the Salinas government liberalized
rules on foreign investment and abolished eighty percent of the re-
quirements for import licenses. Additionally, a campaign was put in
motion that privatized hundreds of state enterprises. 87 For example,
Mexican telephone was denationalized and auctioned as a privatiza-
tion asset with a built-in five-year transition phase.' 88 These reforms
stimulated the economy. Two-way trade between Canada and Mex-
ico doubled between. 1986 and 1991.89
One device used since 1965 by Mexico as a mechanism for eco-
nomic interchange with the United States is the Maquiladora pro-
gram. 190 The Maquiladora industry was established under the Mexi-
can Border Industrialization Program. Essentially, it facilitated
location of industrial plants of foreign businesses within Mexico for
the assembly, processing and finishing of foreign materials and com-
ponents.' 9 ' Foreign business provided the capital and machinery
180. Ambassador John D. Negroponte, Continuity and Change in US-Mexican Rela-
tions, 26 COLUM. J. WORLD BUSINESS 6, 7 (Summer 1991).
181. Longley & Wv, supra note 153, at 64.
182. Ritchie, supra note 151, at 75.
183. Negroponte, supra note 180, at 7.
184. Longley &Wv, supra note 153, at 64.
185. Negroponte, supra note 180, at 7.
186. Longley & Wv, supra note 153, at 64.
187. Negroponte, supra note 180, at 7.
188. Gabriel Szekely and Oscar Vera, What Mexico Brings to the Table - Negotiating
Free Trade with the U.S., 26 COLUM. J. WORLD BUSINESS 28, 33 (Summer 1991).
189. Negroponte, supra note 180, at 7.
190. Leonard P. Feldman, US-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, 4 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 553,
564 (Fall 1991).
191. Id. at 565.
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while the Mexican economy provided low-cost labor1 92 and the Mex-
ican government agreed not to place duties on imports of component
parts and materials and the United States government imposed tar-
iffs on finished goods only to the extent of value added. The results
were impressive. The Maquiladora program facilitated establishment
of 1750 plants,1 93 provided labor opportunities for 450,000 Mexican
workers, facilitated technology transfer, and provided foreign invest-
ment opportunities."" An additional advantage from the U.S. per-
spective is that the advent of this mechanism saved hundreds of U.S.
firms from succumbing to Asian competition. 195
There are several advantages for Mexico, which would result
from entering into a free trade area with the United States.1 96 Such
a trade agreement would be an extension of Mexico's economic and
political reforms.1 97 Free trade would serve the privatization policy
by strengthening market mechanisms and encouraging foreign in-
vestment. " A United States-Mexico free trade agreement would
constitute a commitment both domestically and internationally by
the Mexican government to pursue free market economic develop-
ment policies.19 9 The particular economic advantages to Mexico
would be multifaceted.200 Access to the U.S. market entails access to
technology, heavy machinery, and hi-tech products badly needed in
Mexico. A free trade agreement's further solidification of Mexican
economic liberalization would entice U.S. investment by providing
certainty and predictability in the market.201 This infusion of tech-
nology and capital would effectively increase Mexican employment,
productivity, and competitiveness.2 0 1
Mexico is also motivated by concern about trade diversion re-
sulting from the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.20 3 To effec-
tively compete for United States trade (e.g. auto parts, energy, etc.),
Mexico must get a foot in the door by bringing down trade barriers.
Another serious concern motivating Mexico is its huge foreign
192. Szekely, supra note 188, at 31.
193. Of these plants, approximately two-thirds are owned by United States citizens, one-
fourth by Mexican nationals, and three percent by Japanese. See Feldman, supra note 190, at
565.
194. Feldman, supra note 190, at 565.
195. Roberto Batres, A Mexican View of the NAFTA, 26 COLUM. J. WORLD BUSINESS
78, 79 (Summer 1991).
196. Longley &Wv, supra note 153, at 64.
197. Id.
198. Tape of AALS 1992 Annual Meeting in San Antonio, TX: "US, Canada & Mex-
ico - Free Trade"; Hufbauer, supra note 160, at 10.
199. Longley & Wv, supra note 153, at 64.
200. Feldman, supra note 190, at 575.
201. Id. at 579.
202. Id. at 577.
203. Longley &Wv, supra note 153, at 64.
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debt." 4 At two hundred billion U.S. dollars, Mexican foreign debt is
the second highest in the world. Mexico therefore looks to a free
trade area to help finance itself by means of increasing trade flow
and generating foreign exchange earnings. 20 5 A peripheral advantage
of economic development would be reducing labor flight from Mex-
ico to the United States southwest. 0 6
Previous trade agreements between the United States and Mex-
ico also serve to facilitate creation of the proposed free trade area.20 7
In 1987, Mexico and the United States concluded an agreement
known as the Framework of Principles and Procedures for Consul-
tation Regarding Trade and Investment Relations.0 8 This mecha-
nism provided for consultation, negotiation, and resolution of trade
issues. Agreement has been reached on textiles, steel and alcohol
under the Framework. The two nations also participated in Trade
and Investment Facilitation Talks (TIFTs), [hereinafter TIFTS]
which dealt with trade issues by specific product and cross-sectoral
approaches.
Another area that may serve as a prelude to free trade area
agreement is Transboundary Resource Management. 0 9 The United
States and Mexico share a national boundary, maritime boundaries
and a global atmosphere. Moreover, there is a history of some coop-
eration and joint-action between the neighbors with regard to bound-
ary waters, hazardous waste transfers, spill management, fisheries,
and boundary petroleum resources. The means used for common ac-
tion along the boundaries may serve as a basis for extended common
policy in non-boundary areas.
The NAFTA negotiations concluded at the end of the summer
of 1992 with a finished document which purportedly was ready for
ratification. However, the new U.S. administration that took office in
January 1993 has made it clear that it will seek and is currently
seeking parallel agreements in labor, environment, "safeguard provi-
sions", and other areas of concern before ratification can take place.
Irrespective of ratification, some commentators see a "silent in-
tegration" occurring independently of political instruments.210 Mex-
ico has rapidly become the United States' third-largest trading part-
ner, while the United States is Mexico's largest. Roughly seventy
percent of all Mexican exports already go to the United States with-
204. Feldman, supra note 190, at 576.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 579.
207. Id. at 565-567.
208. Id. at 566.
209. AALS 1992 Annual Meeting, supra note 198.
210. Steve Fainaru, Air of Secrecy Clouds EC-Style Trade Treaty, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 12, 1992, at 73, Focus; Hufbauer, supra note 160, at 3.
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out a free trade arrangement. In addition, in areas such as electric-
ity, trade dates back to 1905 with essentially free trade existing
today.'21
Proponents argue that despite concern that a free trade agree-
ment would cost American jobs, the American job market would
only be slightly impacted. 212 Mexico's economy is 1/25 the size of
the U.S. economy, with a gross national product barely equal to that
of Florida. In addition, movement and adjustment of labor does not
necessarily entail a loss of jobs.213 It is argued that Mexico mainly
offers only cheap, unskilled labor. 21' Admittedly, to a certain extent,
this type of employment may be siphoned out of the United States.
However, it is argued that in return the larger market also means
larger economic demand and a resulting creation of new employment
opportunities in the United States. Statistics are cited indicating that
an open market with Mexico will lead to net job creation in the
United States, albeit through readjustment.2 5
There are many points of opposition to the free trade area stem-
ming from various interest groups. 2 " Agricultural groups on both
sides of the border enjoy their protected status and are not eager to
relinquish it. American farmers want to keep out tomatoes and other
vegetables. Florida growers are especially fearful of fruit imported
from Mexico. Likewise, Mexican farmers do not want to compete
with the more efficient American grain and corn agribusiness. 21
Unionized unskilled labor industries in textiles, steel, auto man-
ufacturing have also expressed concern and opposition. 21 8 These la-
bor groups, assert that they are vulnerable to a southern neighbor
possessing plentiful low-cost labor.2 9 They fear industrial shutdown
and relocation south of the border.
Energy resources are another area of contention. U.S. energy
and petrochemical groups eagerly look to the free trade negotiations
to invest in Mexico's energy resources and provide the capital, tech-
nology and equipment necessary to develop a new global energy
source. 220 However, the Mexican Constitution explicitly prohibits
foreign ownership of or foreign investment in petroleum and all solid,
211. Lori M. Rodgers, What Will A Mexican Trade Agreement Mean To The US En-
ergy Industry, 128 PuB. UTIL. FORT. no. 1, July 1, 1991.
212. Fainaru, supra note 210, at 73.
213. Batres, supra note 195, at 79.
214. Dornbusch, supra note 152, at 73.
215. Batres, supra note 195, at 79.
216. Longley & Wv, supra note 153, at 69.
217. Bill Mintz, Free Trade's Fine Print, HOUSTON CHRON., June 28, 1992, at 1, Busi-
ness Section.
218. Longley & Wv, supra note 153, at 69-70.
219. Mintz, supra note 217, at 1.
220. Id.
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liquid, or gaseous hydrocarbons.22' In fact, in the 1970s, the Mexi-
can Government expropriated U.S. oil holdings.2" This action is still
viewed with nationalist pride in Mexico, despite the economic frag-
mentation it caused. Mexico unequivocally refuses to negotiate this
constitutional mandate.2 3 Furthermore, the government not only
refuses foreign ownership rights, but also excludes foreign energy
service and processing industries such as gas transmission and pe-
trochemical production. Meanwhile the state-owned oil monopoly,
Pemex, is extremely short of capital. On both sides of the border,
protection of inefficient domestic industries frustrates free trade
agreements as well as economic advancement.
The basic NAFTA agreement, embodying the institutional
structure, principles, objectives and specific tariff schedules, has been
signed by the heads-of-state, but awaits ratification pending agree-
ment on parallel agreements. 224 Political opposition is anticipated
from discontent interest groups, unless the governments unilaterally
or otherwise provide relief to such disaffected groups.
2 25
C. Latin American Regional Blocs
A number of regional groupings have emerged in Latin
America (South America, Central America and the Caribbean) over
the past few decades in a variety of forms and structures. None of
the Latin American efforts have paralleled the European Commu-
nity success. However, like the European Community, in the late
1980s these Latin American regional organizations rekindled their
commitment to integration and regional cooperation.
1. Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA).-An
221. Rodgers, supra note 211.
222. AALS 1992 Annual Meeting, supra note'197; see Constitucion Politica de Los
Estados Unios Mexicanos (Mexican Constitution).
223. Mintz, supra note 216, at 1.
224. Bradsher, supra note 168; Mintz, supra note 168. As of August 13, 1993, the three
NAFTA countries had agreed on the text of these parallel agreements to protect the rights of
workers and the environment. Considerable debate regarding the effectiveness of these agree-
ments is likely to occur preceding the final vote on approval of NAFTA. Mickey Kantor" At
Long Last, A Trade Pact To Be Proud Of, WALL ST. J. Aug. 17, 1993, at A14; Mary Benanti,
Trade pact heads to Congress/Side deals solve snags in NAFTA, USA TODAY, Aug. 14,
1993, at IA.
As this article is being printed, federal Judge Charles Richey, citing the 1970 National
Environmental Policy Act, had held that any major federal project, including the NAFTA,
must be preceded by an intensive environmental impact study. Public Citizen v. Office of the
U.S. Trade Rep., 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1993). However, on September 24, the U.S. Court
of Appeals in Washington overturned the lower court's ruling, and held that NAFTA does not
require an environmental impact review. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Rep., - F.2d __I
No. 93-5212, 1993 U.S. App. Lexis 24660 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 24, 1993); Michael York, Presi-
dent Wins One On NAFTA; Court Reverses Order To Study Environment, WASH. POST, Sept.
25, 1993, at Al.
225. Bradsher, supra note 168; Mintz, supra note 168.
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early attempt at regional organization in Latin America occurred
with the formation of the Latin American Free Trade Association
[hereinafter LAFTA] by the 1960 Treaty of Montevideo. 226 By
1967, LAFTA included all South and Central American countries
except Guyana, Surinam, and Honduras.227 The objective was to cre-
ate a free trade zone in twelve years on an item-by-item basis.228
LAFTA, however, achieved minimal progress and was dissolved in
1980.229 Three principal reasons have been cited for its failure. 23 0
One reason was the overly ambitious agenda. Rather than using a
realistic schedule, LAFTA imposed a timetable that could not be
accomplished. A second reason for failure was the placement of de-
veloped and underdeveloped nations on par with each other in mar-
ket and structural terms. Ignoring realities of economic disparity and
lack of sensitivity to different economic development levels proved to
be fatal. A third crippling factor was the failure of LAFTA to take
into account historical trade patterns. LAFTA superimposed its con-
cepts of where trade flows should occur without according due atten-
tion to the exchange patterns already in place. For these reasons
LAFTA was replaced in 1980 with a new, more flexible and less
ambitious organization - ALADI (Latin American Integration As-
sociation; Asociacion Latino Americano de Integracion).
21
2. Latin American Integration Association (ALADI).-The
Latin American Integration Association [hereinafter ALADI], was
created by the 1980 Treaty of Montevideo.232 Identified as more flex-
ible and less ambitious than LAFTA, it served mainly as a frame-
work under which smaller, more closely knit regional organizations
could define themselves.2 3 Thus, ALADI projected a modest end
and minimum level of Latin American association, onto which more
sophisticated levels of integration could be built. ALADI sought the
establishment of a common market throughout Latin America by a
long-term, gradual process. Rather than defining phases or stages as
LAFTA had, the methodology of ALADI was to proceed toward a
common market by encouraging regional and sub-regional integra-
226. Treaty of Montevideo Establishing a Free-Trade Agreement and Instituting the
LAFTA, Feb. 18, 1960, GATT Document L/I 157/Rev.1; see Timothy F. O'Leary, The An-
dean Common Market and the Importance of Effective Dispute Resolution Procedures, 2
INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 101 (Winter 1984).
227. Id.
228. Eliana V. de Davidson, The Treaty of Asuncion and a Common Market for the
Southern Cone: A Timely Step in the Right Direction, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 265, 266 (Fall
1991).
229. Id. at 267.
230. Id.
231. Id.; Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin American Integration Associa-
tion, Aug. 12, 1980, 20 I.L.M. 672 (1981).
232. Davidson, supra note 228, at 267.
233. The Business of the American Hemisphere, ECONOMIST, August 24, 1991, at 37.
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tion efforts along with other cooperative ventures.23 4
Recognizing the shortcomings of LAFTA, the drafters of
ALADI explicitly recognized the principle of "Differential Treat-
ment" and created three categories of nations based on the degree of
their economic development: (1) Less Developed, (i.e. Paraguay); (2)
Intermediate; (i.e. Uruguay), and (3) Advanced, (i.e. Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico). 35 These development classifications are relative to
one another, as Latin America is generally less developed in relation
to the world community. The different classifications were to be ac-
corded different treatment with regard to trade liberalization.
The organizational structure of ALADI consists of three pri-
mary institutions.2"' The Council of Foreign Ministers, "Consejo de
Ministros," is the highest executive authority, making decisions as to
general policy directions toward integration. The Committee of Rep-
resentatives, "Comite' de Representantes," is a permanent body con-
sisting of one representative from each state which meets annually to
attempt to negotiate region-wide tariff reductions. Lastly, the Con-
ference for Evaluation and Convergence, "Conferencia de Evalua-
cion y Convergencia," meets once every three years to review the
progress throughout Latin America and to promote and revamp
measures toward increased free trade and "complementarity. '"I"
3. Sub-Regional Organizations.-Several sub-regional organi-
zations have emerged under the umbrella of Latin America's
LAFTA and ALADI. Some are as old as the Central American
Common Market [hereinafter CACM], founded in 1961,238 others
as new as the Common Market of the South [hereinafter
MERCOSUR] founded in 1991.39 In the late 1980s the thrust of
Latin American regional organization mirrored world trends in Eu-
rope, North America, and Asia.240 The Latin American developing
countries also became disenchanted with the interventionist, socialist
closed economies. Moreover, these nations grew tired of constant
debt. 41 Third world debt, the nightmare of creditor nations, is also a
234. Davidson, supra note 228, at 267.
235. Id. at 268; Treaty of Montevideo, supra note 231, at Art. 3(d).
236. Treaty of Montevideo, supra note 231, art. 28; Davidson, supra note 228, at 269.
237. Treaty of Montevideo, supra note 231, arts. 28, 30, 33-35; Davidson, supra note
228, at 269.
238. Treaty of Montevideo, supra note 231, arts. 33-35; General Treaty on Central
American Economic Integration, Dec. 13, 1960, 455 U.N.T.S. 3; Davidson, supra note 228, at
270.
239. Treaty of Asuncion: (Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argen-
tine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Republic
of Uruguay) March 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041; see also Davidson, supra note 228, at 267.
240. Sharon Bowden and Martin Elling, In The Shadow of 1992:
Developing Country Efforts at Economic Integration, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 537 (1991).
241. Id. at 539.
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paralyzing force on the debtor nations. Thus, these developing na-
tions began to opt for foreign investment over foreign debt on the
theory that a partner is preferable to a creditor. To attract partners,
their economies had to be unleashed from the strictures of a closed
and controlled market.
(a) Central American Common Market (CACM).-The
Central American Common Market [CACM] was created within
the LAFTA framework by the 1961 General Treaty of Central
American Economic Integration. 42 This sub-regional association
was formed between Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala
and Nicaragua, to promote intra-regional free.trade and to establish
uniform external tariffs. Despite its laudable objectives, CACM was
plagued with political controversy between members which led to its
virtual collapse. Recently, however, there has been an impetus to re-
juvenate CACM between the original five states plus Panama. 43 In
fact, CACM has shown considerable interest in trade and investment
agreements with the United States, and has agreed to form a free-
trade zone with Mexico by 1996.44
(b) Andean Common Market (ANCOM).-The Andean Com-
mon Market [ANCOM], also a sub-regional group under LAFTA,
was created by the 1969 Treaty of Cartegena.21 5 Originally, the
group consisted of Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru.
However, in 1973 Venezuela joined, and in 1976, Chile withdrew.2" 6
An elaborate specified program was framed to achieve the objective
of economic regional integration. ANCOM, which encompassed
states along the west coast of South America, was to reach economic
harmony through the implementation of common external tariffs,
sectoral industrial development programs, harmonized economic pol-
icy, and coordinated development plans.247
ANCOM has the most formal institutionalized structure of the
Latin American sub-regional efforts.24 8 The Cartegena Agreement
itself provided for the establishment of a Junta and a Commission.249
The Commission is a five-member decision-making body that meets
242. General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration, supra note 238; Da-
vidson, supra note 228, at 270.
243. The Business of the American Hemisphere, supra note 233, at 37.
244. Id.
245. Agreement on Subregional Integration (The Cartegena Agreement), May 26,
1969, 8 I.L.M. 910 (1969); see Davidson, supra note 228, at 270.
246. O'Leary, supra note 226, at 101.
247. The Cartegena Agreement, supra note 245, art. 3; Davidson, supra note 228, at
271.
248. Davidson, supra note 228, at 271.
249. The Cartegena Agreement, supra note 245, art. 5; O'Leary, supra note 226, at
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three times a year in addition to special sessions. By a two-thirds
majority, legislative actions can generally be adopted. Additionally,
the Commission is empowered to select members to the Junta by
unanimity. With three independent members, who may be from any
Latin American nation, the Junta submits unanimously-approved
legislative proposals to the Commission.25" Also, in their supervisory
role over ANCOM implementation, where all three determine error,
they may issue resolutions to remedy a situation. ANCOM also cre-
ated the Andean Parliament in 1979 and the Andean Development
Bank and Reserve Fund in 1976.251
Dispute resolution provisions under the Cartegena Agreement
are contained in Article 23 which incorporates by reference the arbi-
tration procedure found in the LAFTA Protocol for the Settlement
of Disputes.2 52 This process essentially entailed the selection of three
judges from a previously composed pool, hearing, and decision by
majority vote. In 1979, ANCOM decided to bring dispute resolution
exclusively within their region by creating the Andean Court.2 5 This
supranational tribunal has five justices that serve six-year terms.2 54
Although each member state has a justice on the court, each must
be fully independent in his performance. The role of the Andean
Court is to interpret the law of ANCOM found in the Cartegena
Treaty (the treaty establishing the Court), Commission Decisions
and Junta Resolutions.2 55 The powers of the court are three-fold.256
First, Commission decisions and Junta resolutions may be nullified if
inconsistent with ANCOM law. Second, action may be taken against
states violating ANCOM law. Third, advisory opinions may be is-
sued when solicited by national judges.
The institutional structure was formed to implement mandates
identified in the founding treaties which include Sectoral Programs
of Industrial Development [SPIDs], sub-regional trade liberalization,
Common External Tariff [CET], and Investment Code for common
treatment of foreign capital.2 57 The SPID mandate found in articles
32 and 33 of the Cartegena Agreement attempts to promote industry
250. The Cartegena Agreement, supra note 245, at 13, 15, 17; O'Leary, supra note 226,
at 106.
251. Davidson, supra note 228, at 271.
252. The Cartegena Agreement, supra note 245, art. 23; O'Leary, supra note 226, at
120.
253. Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartegena Agreement, May 23, 1979,
18 I.L.M. 1203 (1979); Davidson, supra note 228, at 271.
254. Treaty Creating the Court of Justice, supra note 253, art. 7, 9; O'Leary, supra
note 226, at 121.
255. Treaty Creating the Court of Justice, supra note 253, art. I; O'Leary, supra note
226, at 122.
256. Treaty Creating the Court of Justice, supra note 253, art. 17-31; O'Leary, supra
note 226, at 122.




by creating a coordinated division of production. Although projects
have been adopted in metal working, petrochemicals and automo-
biles by the Commission, little has been achieved thus far.
The internal trade liberalization mandate sought a free trade
area between the member states. 58 The program divided goods into
four categories: (1) goods produced under SPIDs; (2) goods included
under the LAFTA tariff-reduction plan; (3) goods not presently pro-
duced in any ANCOM member state; and (4) a residual category.
Although some steps were made toward freer trade, significant pro-
gress was hampered by unilateral actions undermining the mandate.
For example, in 1983 alone, Columbia added 2000 products to its
import license list, Venezuela imposed new duties and licensing re-
quirements on 1200 items, and Ecuador banned the import of 639
items.259 In this climate and with these protectionist attitudes, the
move to free trade was crippled.
Supplementing the internal free trade concept was the Common
External Tariff (CET) mandate.260 The ANCOM plan to achieve
the CET was a two-stage process. First, over the course of five years
the member states were to set minimum external tariffs on like
goods. Then, within another five years, the member states should
adopt a common external tariff. This mandate had some success in
that Venezuela, Columbia and Peru were able to establish a mini-
mum external tariff on over 2000 items.
The fourth mandate was pursued in the form of Decision 24,
entitled "Common Code for the Treatment of Foreign Invest-
ment."2 ' Essentially, this required detailed registration and express
authorization of any foreign investment. If the investment threatened
to compete with a domestic industry already established and per-
forming adequately, then foreign capital entry was barred. Further-
more, repatriation of profits on the foreign investment permitted was
limited to twenty percent of the capital investment.
In 1988, ANCOM reorganized in an effort to re-launch its plan
for integration.2"2 The Andean Pact, with its new, more flexible
structure aims at establishing an association similar to the European
Community. 63 The plan entails internal free trade by 1992, a com-
258. The Cartegena Agreement, supra note 245, arts. 41, 45; O'Leary, supra note 226,
at 108.
259. O'Leary, supra note 226, at 108.
260. The Cartegena Agreement, supra note 245, art. 61; O'Leary, supra note 226, at
109.
261. Decision 24 of the Commission of the Cartegena Agreement, 16 I.L.M. 138
(1977); O'Leary, supra note 226, at 109-110.
262. Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, 28 I.L.M. 1165 (1989); The Busi-
ness of the American Hemisphere, supra note 233, at 37.
263. Julia Michaels, Latin Free-Trade Pacts Proliferate, CHR. SC. MON., March 18,
1992, at 10.
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mon external tariff by 1994, a common market by 1995, and an inte-
grated market by 1996.264 Despite these ambitious goals, obstacles
persist. One hurdle is economic development differentials. For exam-
ple, the Gross National Product (GNP) of Venezuela is five times
greater than that of Bolivia. Other hurdles which stem from political
and criminal conduct are terrorism, drug trafficking, political fac-
tionalism and insurrection.265 Nevertheless, in 1992, the ANCOM
successfully inaugurated duty free regional trade and achieved a
three-year reduction in average external import tariffs of sixty-seven
percent .266
(c) Caribbean Community (CARICOM).-The Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) originated with the 1973 Treaty of
Chaguaramas267 as an outgrowth of the Caribbean Free Trade Asso-
ciation. 26 8 CARICOM has one of the largest memberships of Latin
American organizations: Antigua, Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Be-
lize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Grenadines, Montserrat,
St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Trinidad-Tobago.26 9
Like ANCOM and CACM, there was only slight progress in this
region largely because of severe political, economic and technological
difficulties.
270
Following the patterns set by ANCOM and CACM, CAR-
ICOM has made a new commitment in recent years to reduce tariffs
and integrate domestic policy in order to achieve a common market
by 1994.271 One of the first implementing steps was the adoption in
1991 of a Common External Tariff.2 72 The CET entails bringing im-
port duties within a range of five to forty-five percent, averaging
twenty percent overall. Another step toward integration is the effort
to establish a single Caribbean Stock Exchange. 27 13 As of 1991, there
were three stock exchanges existing in the CARICOM region: In
Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago. A gradual approach was
devised to reach a single exchange. Stages limited to cross listing of
securities and then to cross trading preceded full scale merger of the
three exchanges into one. The objective of the single exchange is to
facilitate the free movement of capital and investment.
264. The Business of the American Hemisphere, supra note 233, at 37.
265. Michaels, supra note 263, at 10.
266. James Brooke, Latin America's Regional Trade Boon, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1993,
at DI.
267. Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), July 4, 1973, 946
U.N.T.S. 17, 12 I.L.M. 1033 (1973). Bowden, supra note 240, at 539.
268. Davidson, supra note 228, at 270.
269. Michaels, supra note 263, at 10.
270. Davidson, supra note 228, at 270.
271. Michaels, supra note 263, at 10.




Presently, there is movement toward creating a sub-region
within the sub-regional CARICOM and the regional ALADI frame-
work.274 This unit of CARICOM involves the windward island mem-
bers of the community: Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vin-
cent. Their intent is to merge politically. Whether this union will
actually arise will be decided by referendum held in the windward
states. No date has been set for the referendum, yet it is expected to
occur before the end of 1993.275
(d) Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR).-The
most recent sub-regional association within Latin America is the
MERCOSUR - Mercado Comun de Sur (Common Market of the
South).2 78 The 1992 Treaty of Asuncion created MERCOSUR,
popularly known as the "Southern Cone," to operate within the 1980
Montevideo-ALADI framework. MERCOSUR, uniting Brazil, Ar-
gentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, brought 190 million people into a
common market plan.
277
Various cooperative projects were undertaken establishing links
between the states years before MERCOSUR was envisioned.2 78 For
example, Paraguay and Brazil, by the 1973 Treaty of Itaipu, entered
a joint project to build the largest hydro-electric facility in the world
along their shared border at Itaipu. Likewise, Argentina and Brazil
participated in, joint ventures in the automotive sector: Autolatina
(Ford-Volkswagen). 279 Another example of links formed prior to
MERCOSUR is the 1973 CAUCE trade cooperation agreement be-
tween Uruguay and Argentina."'
Formal development of the Southern Cone began as early as
'1985 with bilateral relations between Argentina and Brazil. 281 That
year, the two nations agreed to remove tariffs on six hundred capital
goods and selected 1998 as the target date for a common market. As
a result of the tariff concessions, trade between the two states rose
over 80% in the late 1980s. 28 2 A further integration agreement be-
tween Argentina and Brazil set up a Joint Integration Committee
and a Joint Ad Hoc Legislation Committee in 1987.283 In 1990, the
plan was accelerated, moving the deadline for common market up to
1994 and concluding twenty-five more agreements focused mainly on
274. Id. at 542.
275. Mediz Blitz on Union, N.Y. TIMES (Miami Herald Abstract), Jan. 28, 1993, at
A12; The People of the Windward Islands, CARIBBEAN UPDATE, Dec. 1992, Issn. 8756-324X.
276. Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 239; see also.Davidson, supra note 228, at 265.
277. Michaels, supra note 263, at 10.
278. Davidson, supra note 228, at 277.
279. Id. at 279.
280. Id. at 277.
281. Bowden, supra note 240, at 543.
282. The Business of the American Hemisphere, supra note 233, at 37.
283. Davidson, supra note 228, at 277.
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abolishing tariffs on primary agricultural goods.2"4 Finally, in March
1991, Argentina and Brazil joined with Paraguay and Uruguay to
reach common market by the end of 1994. More recently, (June
1992) these nations signed a timetable for synchronizing foreign
trade, tax and exchange rate policies in preparation for the 1995
Common Market target date.2"'
The MERCOSUR Treaty of Asuncion, is somewhat modelled
after the European Community Treaty of Rome.28 6 It contains
twenty-four articles organized into six chapters, with five annexes
detailing implementation requirements. 8 7 Like the Treaty of Rome,
Chapter 1 of Asuncion sets out the principles, purposes and objec-
tives of the association. They include: (1) elimination of duties and
non-tariff barriers; (2) establishment of a common external tariff,
(3) development of common trade policy, (4) coordination of macro-
economic policy; and (5) harmonization of domestic legislation.
These general guidelines provided the basis for implementing mea-
sures, such as those contained in the annexes. Annex I, for example,
specifically addresses tariff reductions between member states. In
particular, as of June 1991, duties were reduced by as much as
forty-seven percent. Every six months thereafter, tariffs were to be
reduced in increments of seven percent until free trade was reached.
Annex II outlines the rules of origin in order to determine which
goods receive preferential treatment. Safeguard clauses were placed
in Annex IV to allow exemptions in exceptional circumstances.
These exemptions protect goods when the domestic market is
harmed or threatened with grave harm by free trade.
MERCOSUR resembles the European Community in its insti-
tutional structure to a certain extent.288 The entities established
serve primarily administrative and executive functions. 2 9 The high-
est authority, the Consejo del Mercado Comun (Council of the Com-
mon Market) consists of foreign and economic ministers of the mem-
ber states. The Grupo Mercado Comun (The Common Market
Group) performs executive functions in various working bodies. Also,
a permanent administrative Secretariat was set up at Montevideo.
The final institution of MERCOSUR is the Comision Parlamentaria
Conjunta (Joint Parliamentary Commission). As to dispute resolu-
tion, provisions were set out in Annex III to serve during the interim,
284. Bowden, supra note 240, at 544.
285. Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 238, at Annex I; David R. Francis, Trading Blocs:
Good or Bad for Nations?, CHR. SCl. MON., July 17, 1992, at 12.
286. The Business of the American Hemisphere, supra note 233, at 37.
287. Davidson, supra note 228, at 273-74.




until a permanent system is devised.290 The deadline for creating a
permanent dispute mechanism is December 31, 1994. In the interval,
controversies go to negotiation. If negotiation is unsuccessful, the is-
sue will be addressed by the Grupo Mercado Comun, and if neces-
sary, the ultimate decisional body is the Consejo del Mercado
Comun.
Integration will contribute to the progress of some large-scale
trans-boundary projects.291 For example, removal of non-tariff barri-
ers and protectionist walls will expedite the efforts to create a trans-
national gas grid/pipeline through the Southern Cone. Moreover, a
waterway project in South America will be similarly facilitated. This
envisioned waterway project is a cooperative venture of a private
multinational enterprise to build in the River Plate Basin. If accom-
plished, goods would be readily transported from landlocked Para-
guay and Bolivia to the Rio de la Plata and on to any world market.
Obstacles do persist in MERCOSUR and should be identified
and understood in order to reach any true progress toward integra-
tion. One of the biggest hurdles to reaching the 1994 target date is
the tremendous inflation raging in the member states. (1990 statis-
tics: Brazil 1800%, Argentina 1344%, Uruguay 129%, Paraguay
40%).292 Moreover, the market uncertainty endemic of Latin
America works as a non-tariff barrier to integration efforts.29 Other
areas deserving attention are the dangers and obstacles that accom-
panied previous integration efforts.29 Included among these are the
risks of exaggerated expectations and overzealous agendas. Regional
associations have suffered from overambition. In addition, inertia,
nationalism, and the potential for conflict between integration mea-
sures and domestic interests seeking safeguards to replace protective
tariff walls have frustrated effective cooperation.
D. Asian Regional Blocks
Nations of Asia have also joined together in regional organiza-
tions. A brief description of these developments follows.
1. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).-A multi-na-
tional economic alliance, known as APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation), was formed in 1989 to promote multi-lateral conversa-
tion.2 95 Two years later, in November of 1991, the APEC members
290. Id. at 276.
291. Id. at 279.
292. Latin American Integration; Getting Together, ECONOMIST, March 30, 1991, at 41.
293. Davidson, supra note 228, at 281.
294. Id.
295. Clayton Jones, Asia-Pacific Group Calls for Open Trade, CHR. SC. MON., Nov.
15, 1991, at I.
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met in Seoul to expand the structure and scope of the association.
Prior to this November meeting, APEC was no more than a loosely
defined, yearly gathering of foreign ministers. Also preceding the
summit, APEC was composed of twelve states: Australia, Brunei,
Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Sin-
gapore, South Korea, Thailand, and the United States. The summit
resulted in three new member states (China, Hong Kong, Taiwan)
and an enhanced commitment to trade cooperation.
298
APEC has agreed to create a permanent Secretariat, the first
sign of institutional development.297 In addition, members decided on
a budget that will finance ten projects promoting regional coopera-
tion and growth.298 APEC's outlook is largely defined by its objec-
tive: the commitment to free trade. Specifically, the group has called
for reducing trade barriers, stimulating greater economic interdepen-
dence, and improving the living standards of East Asia.
2. Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN).-ASEAN - the Association of South East Asian Na-
tions - is today the world's fastest-growing regional economic
grouping and the United States' third-largest trading partner.2 99 By
the end of the century, ASEAN is projected to reach a one trillion
dollar economy and a market of four-hundred million people. De-
spite these remarkable achievements, ASEAN actually had a very
modest beginning. It was formed in 1967 primarily to settle border
disputes resulting from French, British and Dutch colonialism.300
The association continued as a coalition against the communist pow-
ers in Asia, although the member states (Brunei, Indonesia, Malay-
sia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand) have historically resisted a col-
lective defense arrangement.30' Through the following decades,
ASEAN stood opposed to any communist expansion into the region.
In fact, it had a significant role in objecting to Vietnam's occupation
of Cambodia during the 1980s.
3 0 2
At a summit meeting at Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malay-
296. Id.
297. James Sterngold, A Wary Step Toward Regional Cooperation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
17, 1991, at 5, Section 4, col. 1.
298. Id.
299. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) 6
I.L.M. 1233 (1967); Bob Drogin, Surprise Accord at ASEAN Meeting Could Settle Spat
Over Spratly Islands, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 1992, at A3, col. 4.
300. Charles P. Wallace, 6 Asian Nations Agree to Form Free-Trade Zone, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 1992, at A4, col. 1.
301. Shiela Tefft, South East Asians Inch Toward Developing Regional Trade Bloc,
CHR. ScL. MON., July 25, 1991, at 4.
302. William Branigin, Southeast Asian Leaders Support Plan to Form Regional Free
Trade Bloc, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1992, at A12.
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sia, in January 1992, the ASEAN states worked to establish a free
trade zone program.303 Implementation of the plan, which involves
over 320 million people, is scheduled to occur gradually over fifteen
years.30 " Specifically, tariffs on manufactured goods and processed
agricultural products are scheduled to be cut from levels up to 60%
to less than 5 % by 2008.305 By the end of 1993, fifteen categories of
goods will be affected, including plastics, cement, leather and tex-
tiles. Like almost all regional free trade agreements worldwide,
ASEAN has a provision for product exemption if imports seriously
threaten domestic industries.
Although no institutions were developed, the nations bound
themselves to meet formally at least once every three years. 06 The
ASEAN countries had met only four times in its first 25 years of
existence. Likewise, regional security concerns are to be discussed
every year, even though no institutions have been created to resolve
local disputes. As part of the January 1992 summit, ASEAN invited
Vietnam and Laos to sign the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Coopera-
tion in South East Asia. 0 ' If they accept this invitation, it will bring
them closer to ASEAN. Full membership to impoverished commu-
nist nations, however, is still a distant prospect.
The July 1992 twenty-fifth annual meeting of foreign ministers
produced the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea.30 This
is ASEAN's first formal declaration on regional security. It seeks to
peacefully settle competing claims between China, Vietnam, Malay-
sia, the Philippines, Brunei and Taiwan as to the resource-rich South
China Sea and the disputed Spratly Islands.
IV. Basic Processes and Institutional Framework of Regional
Organizations
A. "Gradualism" and Harmonization
1. European Community Gradualism
(a) Gradualism in the European Community Stages of
Integration.-A predominant theme running through most of the
evolution of the European Community is gradualism. This theme is
303. Tefft, supra note 301, at 4.
304. Branigin, supra note 302, at A12.
305. Wallace, supra note 300, at 4.
306. Id.
307. Branigin, supra note 302, at A12.
308. Drogin, supra note 299, at 3; Chuang Peck Ming, et al., Asean Plans to ask China
and others to sign amity treaty, Bus. TIMES, July 20, 1993; Security, Free Trade Pact to Top
ASEAN Meeting, REUTERS LiB. REP., July 16, 1993; Al Labita, Spratlys seen dominating
Ramos' meetings in China, Bus. TIMES, April 26, 1993; Ramon Isberto, Asia: ASEAN May
Be Key to Regional Security, Experts Say, INTER PRESS SERV., January 13, 1993.
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apparent in the progression from the European Community's modest
free trade and customs union beginnings in the 1950s to its ambi-
tious objectives of a single market by 1992, a single currency by
1999, and aspirations of political unification on the horizon.
The European Community has gradually moved through various
stages of integration. The initial objective of a common market was
a significant move for Europe, yet the process was cautiously gauged
so as not to fail for over-ambition. A twelve-year transition period
was provided for elimination of tariffs between member nations (ac-
complished 18 months ahead of schedule) and the formulation of a
common external tariff.8 09 For thirty years, the European Commu-
nity operated under this Common Market (Free Trade/Customs
Union) framework before it progressed enough to envision the possi-
bility of Europe as a single economic unit. This new objective was
given five years to develop by concentrating on the elimination of
non-tariff barriers (fiscal, physical, and technical)."' The Communi-
ties are now striving towards monetary and political union through
adoption of the Treaty On European Union (Maastricht Treaty).
Some doubts have arisen as to whether the time frames projected to
achieve these goals can be met."
(b) Gradualism in European Community Harmoniza-
tion.-A process that has facilitated Community evolution through
these integration stages is harmonization. Harmonization reconciles
laws, develops common standards, and defines the interrelationships
between member states. Harmonization in the EC has followed a
gradualist approach.
Beginning with the "Lowest Common Denominator" (LCD)
philosophy, harmonization was little more than a process of identify-
ing commonalities. This was relatively unproductive in achieving in-
creased integration, as it merely served to codify already similar ar-
eas. A new philosophy of "optimal" harmonization was accordingly
later adopted. This entailed the development of directives unani-
mously agreed to as authorized by article 100, in order to create a
uniform qualitative standard throughout the member states. The ob-
jective behind optimal harmonization was law reform. Rather than
merely reconciling national laws with each other at the lowest com-
mon denominator level, optimal harmonization sought to reconcile
them with an ideal standard." 2 Despite some progress made in
adopting European standards in new areas, this process proved to be
309. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, art. 8; Calingaert, supra note 8, at 5.
310. White Paper, supra note 40, arts. 10, 46; Nervell, supra note 23, at 200.
311. Treaty on European Union, supra note 5; New European Union Treaty Signed at
Maastricht, supra note 7; supra notes 110-127 and accompanying text.
312. Bernstein, supra note 61, at 676.
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cumbersome and consensus was often difficult to reach.
This led to adoption of the "Minimal Harmonization" philoso-
phy under which only those areas of law in which harmonization was
indispensable to achievement of the single market would be selected
for harmonization and in other areas member states would have to
mutually recognize each other's law. "Mutual recognition" helped
release the gridlock which existed between contrasting national laws
in areas which the EC could not, or simply had not addressed with
directives. This philosophy imposed reciprocal trust and respect be-
tween member states pertaining to their laws.3 13 Although mutual
recognition originated in European Court of Justice case law, it was
given affirmative support by Community institutions as an essential
tool in achieving the Single Market by 1992. 11 Moreover, the Single
European Act facilitated harmonization by inter alia amending the
approximation treaty articles as noted earlier to permit a qualified
majority standard. Reaching a decision by a qualified majority stan-
dard proved faster and easier than struggling for unanimity.
315
Thus, harmonization has taken on a new surge of momentum in
the form of Minimal Harmonization. Unlike the Lowest Common
Denominator method, minimal harmonization may standardize new
areas with merely a qualified majority. And unlike the optimal
method, minimal harmonization allows a margin of error since dis-
senting states (under specified circumstances) are not required to
comply with Community approximation measures. Minimal harmo-
nization is the product of time constraint realities and plays well in a
Maastricht era EC which places "subsidiarity" constraints on ac-
tions of the Brussels institutions.3 16 The minimal harmonization ap-
proach should serve to place national laws in approximation by con-
centrating on achieving as much consensus as possible in areas
essential to achieving the Single Market, and according reciprocal
treatment to the remainder of national law. In effect, the objective of
minimal harmonization is still unity. However, the amount of change
imposed on national laws is limited to that which is necessary.
2. Gradualism in Other Regional Organizations.-An analy-
sis of regional organizations around the world today suggests that
"gradualism" is an indispensable component to success. Organiza-
tions that have ignored this concept have sufferedparalysis, setbacks,
313. MENGOZZI, supra note 3, at 210.
314. Completing the Internal Market: An Area Without Internal Frontiers, [COM(90)
552 final, Brussels] November 23, 1990, at 19-21: and, Completing the Internal Market -
White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, June 1985 (Brussels/Luxem-
bourg), at 22.
315. CALINGAERT. supra note 8, at II.
316. Bernstein, supra note 61, at 679.
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and sometimes dissolution. Bringing several independent states to-
gether to pursue a common direction is a very fragile process, and
requires caution and sensitivity. Unlike the European Community,
most of the world's major regional organizations are merely free
trade areas or customs unions which are not pursuing economic,
monetary or political union. However, the 36-year experience of the
EC as a free trade area and customs union reinforces the thesis of
the need for gradually targeting achievement of higher levels of inte-
gration as demonstrated need for action is recognized by affected
parties.
(a) EFTA Gradualism.-The European Free Trade Asso-
ciation (EFTA), existing since 1960, has been successful in achieving
its limited free trade area scope of working principally toward tariff
concessions amongst its members. For three decades it did not look
to expand this role, contenting itself with strengthening trade rela-
tions between members. In 1990, however, the seven member EFTA
looked to a free trade association with the twelve member European
Community, under the "European Economic Area" (EEA). In addi-
tion, many of the EFTA nations are individually considering applica-
tion for EC membership, which entails the potential for monetary
and political union. This movement towards closer integration is oc-
curring gradually in order to avoid the pitfalls of dislocations within
the economies of member states resulting from over-ambitious sched-
uling of integration. EFTA has a strong basis for integration, given
its 30 plus years of economic coordination. The EFTA-EC integra-
tion agreement targets a deliberate pace to assure workability and
reasonableness.
(b) NAFTA Gradualism.-The North American Free
Trade Area (NAFTA) also illustrates a "gradualism" approach in
its two-stage process of (1) establishing a bilateral free-trade area
between Canada and the United States: and then (2) establishing a
tri-lateral free-trade area between Mexico, Canada and the United
States. Like the European nations, prior relations between the mem-
ber states existed in NAFTA. The United States and Canada had
for years maintained excellent trade and diplomatic relations. Also,
these two countries shared similar cultures and language. Mexico did
not have the long history of close relations nor the similar cultural
traditions with the United States. However, Mexico made an ex-
traordinary philosophical commitment in the 1980s which rendered
itself highly compatible with the United States and Canada by de-
ciding to abandon state interventionism and control of its economy in
favor of a free market system.
Thus, during the 1980s, relations with the United States inves-
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tors typically involved joint projects, such as the Maquiladoras with
Mexico and auto-assembly projects with Canada. In addition, agree-
ments on the U.S. southern and northern borders dealt with trans-
boundary resources. This prior interaction laid the groundwork for
gradually moving toward a free-trade area agreement. Choice of the
free trade level of integration reflects the limited extent to which
Canada, Mexico and the United States are prepared to relinquish
sovereignty. They are seeking mutual economic advantage, but un-
like Europe, they are disinclined to organize into a more elaborate
customs union, single market, or political union. 317 The limited sur-
render of sovereignty under NAFTA is evidenced by the design of
the institutions, and the law making enforcement procedures.
The differential in economic development between Mexico and
Canada/United States is an additional justification for a "gradual-
ist" approach. Although countries of different development levels can
mutually benefit each other economically, a sudden removal of trade
barriers can cause dislocations that produce economic and social
hardships. The gradual approach is therefore desirable.
(c) Latin American Gradualism.-Latin America learned
the lessons of gradualism by suffering the consequences of over-ex-
tension of goals. In 1960, the nations of Central and South America
joined together to form the Latin American Free Trade Association
(LAFTA). This organization set unrealistic goals and attempted to
impose trade patterns between nations without giving due considera-
tion to the local trade patterns which had previously prevailed.
LAFTA was replaced in 1980 with an organization known as Latin
American Integration Association (ALADI). Although this group
encompasses the same members as LAFTA, ALADI is merely an
umbrella organization providing a framework, within which states
who so choose may organize themselves into economic unions.
ALADI, by its nature, is a passive entity, permitting flexibility in
regional-economic development.
Many subregional organizations have formed within Latin
America over the past thirty years, achieving different levels of suc-
cess. Substantially underdeveloped, Latin America's valuable eco-
nomic resources are low cost labor and exports such as coffee, petro-
leum, and agricultural commodities. When these similarly developed
nations bind together, they can profit from economies of scale and
expanded markets. However, for substantial growth, these nations
require capital and technology infusion. Thus, CACM (Central
American Common Market), ANCOM (Andean Common Market),
317. HUFBAUER, supra note 160, at 6.
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and CARICOM (Caribbean Common Market) may have enjoyed
some advantages of scale economies, but they crippled themselves
throughout the 1960s, 1970s and into the 1980s by imposing protec-
tive tariffs and restrictive investment controls vis-a-vis external coun-
tries. The result of such Common External Tariffs and Common In-
vestment Rules was that individual states sought a myriad of
exemptions or simply violated their agreements. CACM, ANCOM,
CARICOM, and MERCOSUR (Common Market of the South) are
making renewed initiatives into the 1990s toward regionalism. The
possible success of these initiatives will be enhanced by use of a
gradualist approach.
(d) ASEAN Gradualism.-The Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), although the fastest growing regional or-
ganization in the world today, has duly respected the idea of gradu-
alism. The member states originally bound together with the very
limited purpose of resolving boundaries at the termination of British,
Dutch and French colonialism. The grouping continued for the next
two decades as a balance against communism in Southeast Asia.
This limited initial purpose enhanced relations, providing a base for
future expansion. As a result, in the late 1980s, ASEAN was pre-
pared to consider integration of economic relations. Despite with-
drawal of the communist threat in the 1990s (the original glue that
held ASEAN together) these nations possessed the groundwork on
which to build a free-trade area. In 1992, ASEAN agreed to work
toward a free-trade area over the next fifteen years. This fairly long
phase-in period demonstrates a realistic approach, as opposed to an
over-ambitious program seeking a customs union, single market or
political union in a short span of time.
B. Institutional Frameworks of Regional Organizations
1. Differences In Structure of Institutions
(a) Institutions of the E.C.-The European Community
approach to development of its institutions also has been consistent
with the characteristic gradualism of Community evolution. The
three treaties with which the European Community originated each
possessed its own institutional framework. Each created a Council of
Ministers, a Commission (High Authority in the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC Treaty)), an Assembly and a Court of Jus-
tice. The three Courts and the three Assemblies were combined into
one Court and one Assembly (presently referred to as the European
Parliament) in 1957. After ten years, by the 1967 Merger Treaty,
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the Commissions and the Councils merged as well.318
Over time, portions of the structure of the European Commu-
nity institutions were revamped and redefined. For example, the Eu-
ropean Parliament's representatives were originally composed of ap-
pointees of member state governments. As of 1979, the
representatives have been directly elected by universal suffrage. 1 9 In
addition, the role of the European Parliament has expanded. The
Single European Act of 1987 devised a secondary procedure, as an
alternative to the "consultation" procedure, for dealing with Com-
munity-law proposals. The new "cooperation" procedure provides for
increased participation of the European Parliament in the legislative
process. 20 The Council has also seen an expansion in its powers with
the change from unanimity to qualified majority voting.321
Changes have also occurred within the judiciary. By the Single
European Act, the Council was empowered to set up (by unanimous
decision) a Court of First Instance in order to divert some of the
workload from the Court of Justice. The Council exercised this au-
thority in October of 1988 by creating a twelve-member Court of
First Instance. The Court is competent to hear specified classes of
cases involving staff regulations of the Communities, competition
law, anti-dumping law, and European Coal and Steel Community
treaty law.322
In addition to the principal- institutional bodies, the Community
also allows for expansion of the bureaucracy by creation of support-
ing units. These units are primarily committees formed by the Par-
liament and by the Commission as an administrative and investiga-
tive support system.323
The European Community is moving toward the creation of
more common institutions. A Central European Bank.has been sug-
gested by the Maastricht Treaty in an attempt to achieve a common-
currency monetary union.32 4 The treaty also addresses congruency of
action with respect to the Conference on Security and Cooperation
318. The Merger Treaty, supra note 16; Treaty of Rome, supra note 14; P.SR.F.
MATHIJSEN. A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 15-16 (5th ed. 1990).
319. Treaty of Rome, supra note 27, art. 138; MATHIJSEN, supra note 318, at 18.
320. Single European Act, supra note 26, art. 6; MENGOZZI, supra note 3, at 20-21.
321. Single European Act, supra note 26, art. 16; MATHIJSEN, supra note 318, at 37.
322. Single European Act, supra note 26, art. 4; The ABC of Community Law (Office
for Official Publications of the European Communities, 3d ed., 1991), at 21-24. THE ARTHUR
ANDERSON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SOURCEBOOK (lain P.A. Stilt & John J. McGonagle, Jr.
eds., 1991) [hereinafter E.C. SOURCEBOOK]; JOSEPHINE STEINER, TEXTBOOK ON EEC LAW
(3d ed. 1992); NEILL NUGENT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY (2d ed. 1991).
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in Europe (CSCE). 25 Gradual formation and development of EC
institutions and gradual conferral of increased authority to them has
contributed to the level of integration of the European Community;
(b) Institutions of Other Regional Organizations.-The
European Community has the most sophisticated institutional struc-
ture of any regional organization in the world. However, other re-
gions have created institutions that sometimes resemble the Euro,
pean Community and other times are categorically different.
ALADI, the framework organization for Latin America possesses a
fairly developed institutional structure: Council of Ministers, Com-
mittee of Representatives and Conference of Evaluation. ANCOM
(Andean Common Market), a regional organization within ALADI,
has an institutional structure designed very similarly to the Euro-
pean Community. It possesses a Junta, a Commission, a Parliament,
a Court, and a Development Bank and Reserve Fund. MERCOSUR
(Common Market of the South), Latin America's newest regional
organization, mirrors ALADI's and ANCOM's emphasis on institu-
tional structure with a Council, a Parliamentary Commission, and
an executive body. CARICOM, a regional organization of the Car-
ibbean nations, is placing a unique emphasis on the formation of a
Common Stock Exchange.
The NAFTA agreement, limited to free trade, is likewise lim-
ited in its institutional structure. The treaty provides for a legisla-
tive-type commission which uses a unanimity voting procedure and a
dispute resolution procedure, but enforcement powers and jurisdic-
tion are narrow.3 6 This design is consistent with the function and
purpose of a free trade area whose member states are intent on pre-
serving their individual sovereignty.
2. Law Making Mechanisms
(a) Characteristics of European Community Law
(i) Powers of the European Community.-The consti-
tutional framework of the European Community created by the
Treaty of Rome as amended grants powers to the various institutions
to act pursuant to delegated powers contained within Treaty articles.
The institutions also possess broader implied powers, pursuant to
which they may take measures that are indispensable for the effec-
tive and meaningful implementation of powers expressly conferred.
325. Treaty on European Union, supra note 5, at Title V; New European Union Treaty
Signed at Maastricht, supra note 7, at 2.
326. North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the United
States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexican
States, Washington, D.C., U.S. Gov't. Print. Off., 1992, at pt. 7, Chapter 20.
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Under the combined express and implied powers, the institutions
have an expansive reach. 2' The European Community is also given
the power to act when necessary to attain treaty objectives regarding
common ideals, values, directions and goals of member states. This is
recognized and explicitly set forth in the Treaty of Rome to include
humanist concepts of peace, unity, equality, freedom, solidarity and
economic and social security. 32 8
Despite this breadth of power, there are limitations to the scope
of Community action in two major respects. First, the European
Community lacks universal jurisdiction. Sovereign states, which
make up the European Community, inherently possess this quality.
Conversely, the EC possesses sovereignty only to the extent that it is
delegated and relinquished by member states. Second, the Commu-
nity institutions lack the power to create new fields of competence.
In other words, they are confined to designated areas. For example,
the Community cannot assume political powers without a new and
separate delegation by the member nations. This is what the Euro-
pean Community states are attempting to achieve through the Maas-
tricht Treaty."2 9
(ii) Tools of Implementation.-European Community
legislative powers may be exercised using regulations or directives.
Regulations apply directly, generally and uniformly 30 to all member
states and are therefore best used when precise conformity is essen-
tial. For example, regulations have been useful as the principal tool
for dealing with agriculture.
Less rigid than regulations, directives dilute the immediacy and
manner of Community intervention into domestic legal and economic
systems by allowing each member state to fashion techniques for
their implementation. Local governments, closer to the citizenry and
culture of their jurisdictions, may accordingly take account of their
idiosyncracies and special circumstances regarding the manner in
which the particular community legislative policy is implemented.
The end result is achievement of the legislative goal with minimized
coercion and friction.3 31 Interpretation by the European Court of
Justice of Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome has significantly
327. The ABC of Community Law, supra note 322, at 7-9. MENGOZZI, supra note 3, at
ch. III; STEINER, supra note 322; NUGENT, supra note 322; E.C. SOURCEBOOK, supra note
322.
328. The ABC of Community Law, supra note 322, at 8-10; STEINER, supra note 322;
NUGENT, supra note 322; EC SOURCEBOOK, supra note 322.
329. The ABC of Community Law, supra note 322, at 9; STEINER, supra note 322;
NUGENT, supra note 322; EC SOURCEBOOK, supra note 322.
330. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, at pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 2, art. 189; see also MENGOZZI,
supra note 3, at 88.
331. The ABC of Community Law, supra note 322, at 25-27; STEINER, supra note 322;
NUGENT, supra note 322; E.C. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 322.
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blurred these lines of distinction. Decisions by the Court in Ratti3 2
and Francovich33 suggest that in cases where a member states fails
to duly implement a directive, a community directive may have the
effect of a community regulation except that the waiting period pro-
vided for its implementation must expire before it automatically
takes effect.
(iii) Interrelationship Between Domestic and Commu-
nity Law.-European Community law and the domestic law of the
various member states are closely interrelated. This overlap arises
because there are many areas in which the European Community
and the individual states possess concurrent jurisdiction. Community
law is applicable where a provision of the Treaty of Rome or Sec-
ondary legislation enacted per the procedures of the Treaty are di-
rectly applicable. 33' Under this concept of direct applicability, Euro-
pean Community law is automatically binding and effective
regardless of state approval or implementation. The result is that any
person or subject may rely on Community law, even where the state
itself continues to enforce law which conflicts with Community
law. 35 Direct applicability was asserted early in the history of the
European Community by the European Court of Justice in Van
Gend & Loos.336 The Court held that all rules worded uncondition-
ally in the Treaty of Rome are legally complete and do not require
further implementation in order to apply to individuals.
In the event of a conflict between European Community law
and domestic law of a member state, Community law prevails. Al-
though the Treaty of Rome does not anywhere contain a supremacy
clause, European Community law is nevertheless supreme. So hold-
ing, the European Court of Justice reasoned that if Community law
were subject to either prior or subsequent domestic law, then Com-
munity law, institutions and treaties would be rendered impotent in
violation of the fundamental nature of the Community. 337 The Euro-
pean Court of Justice recognized this consequence, and in the 1964
Costa case asserted the primacy of Community law over domestic
law. 38 The court held that by the Treaty of Rome significant sover-
332. Ratti, ECJ Case 148/78 (1979), supra note 38.
333. Francovich, ECJ case 6/90 (1990), supra note 38.
334. The ABC of Community Law, supra note 322, at 39. MENGOZZI, supra note 3, at
57-58; STEINER, supra note 322; NUGENT, supra note 322; EC SOURCEBOOK, supra note 322.
335. The ABC of Community Law, supra note 322, at 40; MENGOZZI, supra note 3, at
57-58; STEINER, supra note 322; NUGENT, supra note 322; EC. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 322.
336. Van Gend & Loos Case 26/62 (1963) ECR 1. See also supra note 38.
337. The ABC of Community Law, supra note 322, at 42; MENGOZZI, supra note 3, at
ch. IV; HENRY G. SCHERMERS & DENIS F. WAELBROECK. JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE Eu-
ROPEAN COMMUNITIES (5th ed. 1992); STEINER, supra note 322; NUGENT, supra note 322;
E.C. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 322.
338. Costa v. Enel [1964] ECR 585, CMLR 425 (1964).
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eign rights had been transferred to the European Community.
Therefore, duly enacted European Community law must supersede
contrary domestic legislation in order to prevent unilateral measures
of member states from undermining the Treaty's purpose and design.
(b) Creation of Law in Other Regional Organiza-
tions.-The formulation of law in the European Community is very
unique in that it is accomplished by institutions within the general
guidelines of a treaty. Members of most other regional organizations
of the world are unwilling to surrender sovereignty even in limited
areas and therefore strictly confine themselves to law-making
through treaties, so-called parallel agreements, unanimous vote pro-
cedures, etc. In addition, because the European Community seeks to
expand its association beyond free trade to more complicated cus-
toms unions, single market and economic and political levels of inte-
gration, its legislation is more extensive in scope and addresses more
than the subject of tariff concessions and reductions in customs du-
ties. Most of the world's regional organizations such as NAFTA,
EFTA, and ASEAN focus solely on free trade issues and rely pri-
marily on rules contained within the text of the treaties or parallel or
supplemental agreements. Since these organizations have a more
limited agenda and narrower scope than political, monetary or sin-
gle-market unions, inclusion of governing law in a treaty to be sup-
plemented by parallel or supplemental agreements is feasible.
NAFTA, in Chapter 20, nevertheless provides for a Free Trade
Commission competent to supervise implementation of the agree-
ment and oversee its further elaboration. 39 The creation of this insti-
tution, with such loosely-defined powers, leaves a window open
should the member nations develop a confidence which at some fu-
ture time, induce them to relinquish some degree of sovereignty in
specified areas. The voting procedures for the Free Trade Commis-
sion envisions this possibility, by providing for unanimity decision-
making, "unless the Commission agrees otherwise." The NAFTA in-
stitutions, however, have dramatically less power than the EC
institutions.
Some of the Latin American regional organizations fall some-
where between this NAFTA approach and the European Commu-
nity approach. For example, ANCOM and MERCOSUR both have
legislative-type institutions and are working toward a conferral of
authority to them. 40 Creating a framework for rule making en-
hances relations between the member states by encouraging coopera-
tion and discussion even though unanimity in voting is required.
339. NAFrA, supra note 326, at Ch. 20, art. 2001.
340. See supra notes 252-54, 288.
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Making provision for possible easing of unanimity voting require-
ments in selected areas may facilitate closer integration in future
years. Equally worthy of note is the fact that premature conferral of
law making authority to legislate using ordinary majority or even
qualified majority voting procedures may make it impossible to ob-
tain ratification. In addition, even if ratification is obtained, unac-
ceptable legislation may be generated. Too much, too soon is the les-
son to be learned from the LAFTA experience.
3. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
(a) Various Approaches to Dispute Resolu-
tion.-Resolution of conflicts between nations of a regional organiza-
tion is complicated by factors not present in domestic conflicts be-
tween private parties. 41 One factor is the mixed nature of conflicts
within regional organizations. Although the heart of a dispute may
be a commercial law issue, political factors such as trade policy and
economic interests give the controversy additional dimensions. An-
other factor complicating the resolution process, is the existence of
contrasting legal systems. Contrasts can stem from different legal
methodologies. For example, the common-law and civil-law systems
differ in approach and process. On the other hand, contrasts can also
stem from different ideologies. A third factor unique to the interna-
tional dispute is the difficulty of viewing justice from a non-national
perspective. Despite the goal of a unified-objective justice system
that regional organizations strive to achieve, these organizations are
inherently multi-national, multi-cultural and multi-lingual. Justice
administered by and imposed on sparring nationals, tends to exceed
the bounds of law and penetrate the political arena.
Choice of a particular dispute resolution system may greatly im-
pact the workability of a supranational settlement process because of
the unique characteristics of various systems."4 2 For example, choices
may have to be made whether: (1) to treat disputes ad hoc or to
establish a permanent standing institution with fixed members; (2)
to use one nation's system (perhaps a civil law country) over an-
other's (perhaps a common law country), or whether to attempt to
blend the systems or use some third option; (3) to permit use of pri-
vate resolution techniques between private parties who elect not to
use the mechanisms created by the association. The special needs of
each organization need to be considered in responding to controver-
sies and deciding which type of dispute resolution procedure is best
suited for particular types of disputes.




(b) European Community Approach - The Court of
Justice.-The European Community took a strong and dramatic ap-
proach in the formation of its dispute resolution institution. The Eu-
ropean Court of Justice (ECJ) is remarkable in the scope of its
power, reach of jurisdiction, and impact on Community law. It is a
permanent standing body with compulsory jurisdiction over persons,
businesses, states and Community institutions, and also has the
power to issue binding decisions on any of these parties. It may hear
controversies that in any way. involve Community law. Furthermore,
in an advisory capacity, it may issue legally binding opinions on con-
ventions that the European Community intends to conclude, and on
aspects of European Community law when solicited by national
court judges." 'a The Court of Justice is also unique as a suprana-
tional court in that it goes beyond the immediate task of resolving
specific controversies, and formulates principles by interpretation of
the Community's legal framework. Thus, the court not only decides
individual cases, but simultaneously shapes law."' It has proven it-
self to be astute and sensitive to the dynamics of the evolving growth
of European Community institutions and has not been averse to
enunciating in "small" cases rules of law having profound and far-
reaching impact. For example, the 1964 case of Costa v. ENEL,4 5
establishing supremacy of Community Law over conflicting Member
State law involved refusal of a consumer to pay an 1800 lire electric
bill, which amounted to approximatly three dollars at the then appli-
cable exchange rate.
(c) Other Regional Organizations' Approaches to Dispute
Resolution3 4 6.- Chapter 20 of the NAFTA specifies an ad hoc pro-
cedure to resolve all disputes arising under the agreement, except
those otherwise specially provided for such as disputes dealing with
anti-dumping or countervailing duties. 47 A request by any state
343. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, at pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, sec. 4: The Court of Justice.
344. The ABC of Community Law, supra note 322, at 21, 35-37; SCHERMERS & WAEL-
BROECK, supra note 337; STEINER, supra note 322; NUGENT, supra note 322; EC.
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 322.
345. (1964) ECR 585, Case 6/64.
346. An analysis of dispute resolution techniques among the world's regional organiza-
tions shows that there exist three general approaches: (1) No mechanism; (2) Ad hoc mecha-
nism, (3) Permanent Court. The European Community, as discussed, uses the permanent
court. The only other major regional organization using a permanent body is ANCOM - the
region of states on the west coast of South America. ANCOM's Andean Court is a permanent
body with broad jurisdiction and five judges which serve six year terms. MERCOSUR has
committed to create a dispute resolution mechanism by December 31, 1994, but presently uses
its other institutions to wade through controversies. APEC and ASEAN, the Asian regional
organizations, are silent as to dispute resolution procedure.
347. NAFTA, supra note 326, ch. 20, art. 2004; NAFTA, supra note 326, at ch. 19.
Because of Chapter 20's broad jurisdictional standard, NAFTA's dispute resolution mecha-
nism will apply to disputes between the Parties covering the wide-ranging rules on such non-
traditional and complex subjects as health, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, and intellec-
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(Canada, United States, Mexico) may be made for consultation re-
garding any actual or proposed measure of another state which pur-
portedly affects the treaty.3" 8 If consultations fail, the Commission
may use good offices, conciliation or mediation to help reach a mutu-
ally-satisfactory resolution.3" 9 Failure at this juncture sends the con-
troversy to the Arbitration Panel for resolution. 5 The Panel is com-
posed of five individuals selected from the official roster.
3 5 1
The Roster of Arbitration Panelists consists of thirty persons,
appointed by consensus for three-year terms. Qualifications include
expertise or experience in law, international law, or resolution of in-
ternational trade disputes. 352 For settlement of Investment or Finan-
cial Services disputes, there are an additional fifteen expert panelists
to choose from. 53
The Panel will issue an Initial Report, to which written com-
ments may be made, followed by a Final Report.354 It will contain
(1) findings of fact; (2) an opinion as to whether the measure at
issue is consistent with NAFTA; and (3) recommendations for reso-
lution of the dispute. If the party in violation does not remedy the
situation, the complaining party may suspend treaty benefits of
tual property. Financial services are also covered under Ch. 20, with a few deviations specified
under Article 1415. See Jeffrey P. Bialos & Deborah E. Siegel, Dispute Resolution Under the
NAFTA: The Newer and Improved Model, 27 INT'L LAW. 603, 613 (1993) [hereinafter An-
nouncement of NAFTA Supplemental Agreements].
Other special dispute resolution procedures are provided for in the Aug. 13, 1993 lateral
agreements on labor and the environment. The agreement on environmental cooperation pro-
vides inter alia that in the field of environmental cooperation each member country guarantees
access to national courts and transparency to all judicial and administrative proceedings. In
addition, in the event that one Party considers that another Party has persistently failed to
effectively enforce its environmental laws (affecting a section involving traded goods or ser-
vices), the matter may be referred to a dispute settlement panel. This dispute settlement pro-
cess provides for sanctions if countries have failed to correct problems of nonenforcement. In
the case of Canada, the Commission, on the request of a complaining Party, collects the mone-
tary enforcement assessment and enforces an action plan in summary proceedings before a
Canadian court of competent jurisdiction. In the case of Mexico and the United States, the
complaining Party or Parties may suspend NAFTA benefits based on the amount of the as-
sessment. Ambassador Mickey Kantor U.S. Trade Rep., Announcement of NAFTA Supple-
mental Agreements on Labor and the Environment (Aug. 13, 1993). [hereinafter announce-
ment of NAFTA Supplemental Agreements].
Comparable guarantees for open access to administrative and judicial remedies in the
labor field are also reported. In addition, the agreement on labor cooperation provides for
dispute settlement panels, backed ultimately by fines and trade sanctions, which can be in-
voked.if a party believes that another is demonstrating a persistent pattern of failure to effec-
tively enforce labor laws. Moreover, Canada has again made the panels judgments on fines and
remedial actions automatically enforceable in its domestic courts. In the case of Mexico and
the United States, the complaining Party or Parties may suspend NAFTA benefits based on
the amount of the assessment. Id.
348. Id. art. 2006.
349. Id. art. 2007.
350. Id. art. 2008.
351. Announcement of NAFTA Supplemental Agreements, supra note 347, art. 2011.
352. Id. article 2009.
353. Id. pt. 5, ch. 14, art. 1415.
354. Id. pt. 7, ch. 20, arts. 2016, 2017.
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equivalent effect.355
Anti-dumping and countervailing duty controversies are pro-
vided with their own dispute resolution procedure under Chapter 19.
The chapter allows for the retention of existing domestic law.3 5 6
However, any changes or modifications are subject to notice and con-
sultation requirements. Disputes are settled by ad hoc panels of five,
drawn from a special roster. This roster includes at least seventy-five
members, and to the fullest extent possible, sitting and retired judges
possessing a general familiarity with international trade law.
3 57 If
the panel issues a declaratory opinion finding nonconformity, correc-
tive legislation or a mutually satisfactory solution must be reached
within nine months.3 5" Failure to comply gives the aggrieved party
the right to impose comparable or equivalent retaliatory action, or to
terminate the agreement with respect to the nonconforming state.
359
V. Conclusion
Proponents of regional integration assert that free trade areas
and higher levels of economic and political integration: 1) provide
opportunities for economies of scale; 2) enable the law of compara-
tive advantage to shift resources to maximize their use; 3) enhance
market competition to the benefit of consumers; and 4) in general
create a dynamic market which contributes to a higher standard of
living. They also assert that the global impact of such integration is'
positive because increased demand and production within regional
organizations presents growth opportunities for other nations in an
economically interdependent world.
More than a theoretical justification of the advantages of re-
gional integration is, however, required to catalyze nations to surren-
der sovereignty in order to implement regional organization. The
amount of sovereignty required to be surrendered is proportionate to
the level of integration sought to be achieved (i.e., a free trade area,
customs union, single market, or economic and political union).
In the case of Europe, the necessary catalyst developed out of
the ashes of World War II, and the mass extermination horrors of
concentration camps which were the cap of centuries of continuous
destructive conflict on the European continent. In the post-World
War II era, a generation of statesmen, all seasoned in the realism of
practical politics, shared the common goal of finding civilized proce-
dures to assure co-existence on the continent of Europe and replace
355. Announcement of NAFTA Supplemental Agreements, supra note 347, at 2019.
356. Id. ch. 19, art. 1902.
357. Id. Annex 1901.2.
358. Id. art. 1903.
359. Id.
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the pain of war and the horror of genocide which they had wit-
nessed. Sharing this common goal, the giants of the era -
Adenauer, Churchill, DeGaspari, Monet, Schuman, Spaak - simul-
taneously recognized the economic advantages and political desira-
bility of creating a cooperating integrated union of European states
to replace the fractionalized warring network. Common historical
and cultural ties amongst the European nations also psychologically
tended to link them together.
In the case of a regional organization like NAFTA, however,
the member states have not experienced a tragic history of war and
genocide comparable to the experience of Europe. The motivating
factors favoring integration are accordingly based primarily on eco-
nomic considerations. The necessity for surrender of significant
amounts of sovereignty is not present under these circumstancesto
the extent it was in development of post-World War II European
integration. Accordingly, a more modest integration goal (i.e., only
to the level of a free trade area) and creation of an institutional
framework which requires unanimity in voting and therefore no sig-
nificant surrender of sovereignty is the route chosen. The unanimity
requirement and lack of an effective institutional framework for cre-
ation of legislative norms as new unanticipated problems arise, re-
quires extensive detailed anticipation of such problems in the initial
organization documents and an increased number of accompanying
lateral agreements. This has been the NAFTA experience. It is nec-
essary to anticipate and ameliorate the transitional economic disloca-
tions which are predictably experienced by particular segments of
industry, commerce, and labor in the early stages of integration.
Concerns regarding matters such as preservation of local language,
education and other cultural traditions; the environment; excessive
movement of capital and labor; etc. also must be addressed in the
initial organization documents and lateral agreements because such
matters are more difficult and may prove to be impossible to address
later in a unanimous voting context for creating new norms.
Economic climate obviously has a substantial impact in facili-
tating initiation of integration or developing more sophisticated
levels of integration. This is illustrated by the European experience.
For example, the favorable environment which existed in the early
years of the European Community contributed to the momentum
and enthusiasm which enabled the member states to complete the
initial twelve-year transition stage eighteen months early. Con-
versely, the 1970's inflationary pressures, oil shocks and monetary
instability impeded European Community progress for over a dec-
ade. These economic pressures generated stagnation in employment
which in turn led to recognition of the fact that the cost of non-
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integration was too high to ignore. In part, such pressures induced
Europe to pursue higher levels of integration in order to rescue itself
from further economic paralysis. The result was adoption of-the Sin -'
gle European Act to facilitate creation of a single market - a
higher level of integration than the free trade area and common
market achieved by Europe up to that point.
Economic exigencies have also generated integration momentum
in other regions of the world. In particular, failure of GATT to
achieve continuing progress in the expansion of world trade has
caused nations to attempt to expand world trade on a more manage-
able scale within the framework of regional organizations. The Euro-
pean Community success suggests to nations around the world that
regional organization may be a way to improve their economic lot.
They perceive such organization as an opportunity to coordinate ac-
cess to production assets such as labor, capital, natural resources,
and technology. Proponents argue that a United States-Mexico rap-
prochement would facilitate coordinated use of Mexican labor and
resources with United States capital and technology to produce what
might otherwise be derived from a combination of Japanese technol-
ogy and capital with labor and resources in Asia.
Tension between instinctive retention of sovereignty and the de-
sire to reap benefits of regional cooperation is on-going. Attribution
of political power to a centralized authority or distribution of such
power to local authority is resolved through the political process. For
example, Maastricht simultaneously calls for political and monetary
union and common defense machinery, while also explicitly requiring
application of the "subsidiarity" principle.3 16 The ongoing intensive
debate as to the meaning and effect of "subsidiarity" in Maastricht,
particularly after the initial negative vote on ratification by Den-
mark, dramatically illustrates this continuing tension. Such tension
will continue even though an ongoing series of cases before the Euro-
pean Court of Justice will shift the balance in one direction or an-
other at various periods of time. Although movement of power cen-
ters to the national government in general has been long term
reality, the phenomena of continually redefining lines of demarcation
between centralized and local authority is certainly an experience
well known within our own United States constitutional and political
system.
Another example of this continuing tension is found in the Eu-
ropean Community's concern for the need to achieve approximation
and harmonization of legal systems. This is accompanied by the si-
multaneous recognition of the need for "mutual recognition" of
360. Supra notes 92-127 and accompanying text.
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norms of the individual member states. "Mutual recognition" is
mandated in areas in which community law has not provided a rule
and the public health and welfare of individual citizens would not be
adversely affected by recognition of the validity of the member state
rule.
The "centralizaton-subsidiarity" Maastricht and "harmoniza-
tion-mutual recognition" tensions continue to exist in the context of
persistent demands for preservation of local languages, educational
goals, and other cultural traditions in opposition to the simultaneous
demand for centralization and harmonization.
The philosophy of gradualism practiced by the European Com-
munity suggests that regional free trade and customs duty organiza-
tions under the pressures of recognized economic need for change
may evolve into an effective single market system. The capacity of
such organizations to progressively evolve into a political union and
single monetary system with common defense machinery is currently
being tested.
Imaginative development of regional organizations for the mu-
tual advantage of member states and their citizens requires sensitive
and informed responses to all of these competing demands. Regional
organizations are empirically developing in environments in which
political, economic, social and cultural advantages of such organiza-
tion can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of member states and
their citizens.
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